Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover

Abstract

W e develop and test a general argument about the conditions under which state leaders are most likely to choose legal dispute resolution over bilateral negotiations as a means to settle international disputes. Our central claim is that leaders who anticipate significant domestic audience costs for the making of voluntary, negotiated concessions are likely to seek the "political cover" of an international legal ruling. In such cases, it will be easier for leaders to justify the making of concessions if they are mandated as part of a ruling by an international court or arbitration body. We test a series of domestic-level hypotheses using a dataset comprised of nearly 1,500 rounds of talks concerning disputed territorial claims. Our multivariate analyses indicate that state leaders opt for legal dispute resolution when they are highly accountable to domestic political opposition, as well as when the dispute is highly salient to domestic audiences.

Trade, institutions, and the timing of GATT/WTO accession in post-colonial states

“…The handful of cross-national analyses have focused primarily on the duration of the negotiation process itself (Michalopoulos 2002;Evenett and Primo Braga 2005;Yu and Wong 2008) or analyzed post-colonial states' economic patterns with a different theoretical focus, treating GATT/WTO membership only as a control variable rather than the question of interest (Head et al 2010). Rather than focusing on the timing of accession, scholars of international political economy have devoted the bulk of their efforts to measuring the effects of institutional membership on trade flows and national trade policies (Gowa and Kim 2005;Rose 2004;Goldstein et al 2007;Subramanian and Wei 2007), to clarifying the dynamics of trade round negotiations (Baldwin 2007;Jones 2009a, b;Odell 2009), and to explaining variation in the escalation, outcome, and effects of trade disputes (Busch 2000;Busch and Reinhardt 2001Reinhardt 2001;Guzman and Simmons 2002;Allee and Huth 2006;Kim 2008;Sattler and Bernauer 2008;Davis and Blodgett Bermeo 2009). Previous work has also explored the relationship of developing countries to the GATT/WTO (Pietras 1998;Finger and Winters 1998;Drahos 2003;Clapp 2006;Davis 2006;Patel 2008), as well as the potential for forum shopping in the settlement of trade disputes created by the overlapping jurisdictions of the GATT/WTO and preferential trade agreements (PTAs) (Davis 2006;Busch 2007;Naoi 2009).…”

Contextualizing the Use of the Diplomatic Alternative in Conflict Resolution in the Dispute Between Nigeria and Cameroon Over Bakassi 1994 -2006

“…For instance, according to Collier (1996), more than ninety-nine percent of international disputes must be settled in the end by negotiation. Similarly, Berridge (2005: 121-122) in underscoring the importance of bilateralism says that 'bilateral diplomacy is…relevant in the contemporary world in that usually when negotiations take place, it is much easier on a face to face basis whereby leaders do come together and discuss issues of importance…' In the same vein Allee and Huth (2006) in explaining the merits of bilateralism in dispute resolution offers that the two sides to a dispute have the flexibility to fashion out their desired terms of settlement, and at the same time exercise considerable control over the settlement outcome, by negotiating directly. They add further that in direct negotiations, both sides can also control, at least in part, the information concerning the bargaining process, and the timing of final settlement.…”

Edição Completa

“…For instance, according to Collier (1996), more than ninety-nine percent of international disputes must be settled in the end by negotiation. Similarly, Berridge (2005: 121-122) in underscoring the importance of bilateralism says that 'bilateral diplomacy is…relevant in the contemporary world in that usually when negotiations take place, it is much easier on a face to face basis whereby leaders do come together and discuss issues of importance…' In the same vein Allee and Huth (2006) in explaining the merits of bilateralism in dispute resolution offers that the two sides to a dispute have the flexibility to fashion out their desired terms of settlement, and at the same time exercise considerable control over the settlement outcome, by negotiating directly. They add further that in direct negotiations, both sides can also control, at least in part, the information concerning the bargaining process, and the timing of final settlement.…”