The Partisan Impact of Congressional Redistricting: The Case of Texas, 2001–2003^*

Abstract

Objective. In this article we assess the partisan effects of five plans proposed by Republican state legislators during Texas' 2003 congressional redistricting. Methods. Using the JudgeIt statistical program developed by Gelman and King (2001), and data provided by the Texas Legislative Council, we assess the bias, responsiveness, and the probability that the Democratic Party wins each district for each plan. Results. All five Republican plans, including the one enacted, are strongly biased in favor of the Republican Party. Conclusions. Texas' Democratic legislators were wise to use every parliamentary maneuver available to block the enactment of a new congressional map. Beyond affecting the partisan makeup of the Texas delegation, Texas' redistricting has national implications because it adds to the GOP's narrow majority in the U.S. House of Representatives.

The Intersection of Redistricting, Race, and Participation

“…Much previous work has relied on imprecise measures of redrawn populations, such as the amount of overlap between a county and a congressional district, the district-level percentage of redrawn constituents, or changes in the districtlevel presidential vote (e.g., Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning 2006;Black and Black 2002;Gopoian and West 1984;Kousser 1996;McKee, Teigen, and Turgeon 2006;Petrocik and Desposato 1998;Swain, Borrelli, and Reed 1998;Winburn and Wagner 2010). But we join a growing number of studies that have been able to clearly differentiate between same-incumbent and redrawn voter populations with various units of aggregate-level data (see Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Hood and McKee 2009;Rush 1992Rush , 1993Rush , 2000.…”

Redistricting in the U.S.: A Review of Scholarship and Plan for Future Research

“…But that case was not appealed to the Supreme Court and involved the question of whether statewide Van Beek 1990;Chamberlin 2005;Katz 1999, 2002;Gallagher 1991;Jacobson 1990Jacobson , 2009Anasolabehere, Brady, and Fiorina 1992;Hill 1995;Cain, MacDonald, and McDonald 2005, 14;Mann and Cain 2005;Kousser 1996;and Arrington 2003and Arrington , 2008and Arrington , 2009 King (1990, 1994A&B) and Kastellec, Gelman, and Chandler (2008) use "bias" to mean any deviation from proportional representation, but I regard that usage as confusing. 27 On this relationship see Lyons and Galderisi (1995); King (1989); Cain and Campagna (1987); Glazer, Grofman, and Robbins (1987); Cox (2005, 24-5); Owen and Grofman (1988); Morrill (1990, 232-233); Grofman and Brunell (2005, 186-7); Gopoian and West (1984); Rush (2000); Jacobson (1990Jacobson ( , 94-6, 2009; Desposato and Petrocik (2003); Anasolabhere, Snyder, and Stewart (2000); Cain (1984, 115-7, 148-161); Campagna (1991); Campagna and Grofman (1990); Copeland and McDonald (1987); Niemi and Winsky (1992); McKee, Teigen, and Turgeon (2006). See Grofman (1990) for an in-depth series of readings on Bandemer; and also see Cranor, Crawley, and Scheele (1989); Anderson (1990), and Coyle (2003).…”

Stranger Danger: Redistricting, Incumbent Recognition, and Vote Choice

“…This argument is compelling, but the empirical support for it is based on aggregate-level data. 4 In fact, with a handful of exceptions (e.g., Hayes and McKee, 2009;Karp and Garland, 2007;McKee, 2008a), most of what we know about the effects of redistricting on political behavior is from aggregate-level analyses (see Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart, 2000;Desposato and Petrocik, 2003;Engstrom, 2006;McKee, Teigen, and Turgeon, 2006;Petrocik and Desposato, 1998;Rush, 1992Rush, , 1993Rush, , 2000.…”