We undertake a comprehensive examination of restrictive voter ID legislation in the American states from 2001 through 2012. With a dataset containing approximately one thousand introduced and nearly one hundred adopted voter ID laws, we evaluate the likelihood that a state legislature introduces a restrictive voter ID bill, as well as the likelihood that a state government adopts such a law. Voter ID laws have evolved from a valence issue into a partisan battle, where Republicans defend them as a safeguard against fraud while Democrats indict them as a mechanism of voter suppression. However, voter ID legislation is not uniform across the states; not all Republican-controlled legislatures have pushed for more restrictive voter ID laws. Instead, our findings show it is a combination of partisan control and the electoral context that drives enactment of such measures. While the prevalence of Republican lawmakers strongly and positively influences the adoption of voter ID laws in electorally competitive states, its effect is significantly weaker in electorally uncompetitive states. Republicans preside over an electoral coalition that is declining in size; where elections are competitive, the furtherance of restrictive voter ID laws is a means of maintaining Republican support while curtailing Democratic electoral gains.

Most observers now consider the American South a two-party region, with Democrats and Republicans competing vigorously for political office. In this article, we raise the possibility that the South has begun a transformation into a one-party region dominated by the GOP. Three factors tip the scales in the party's favor: the ideological congruence between the Republican Party and the region's electorate, the Republican trend among the region's younger voters, and the incumbency advantage accrued by current Republican officeholders. Using a vast array of longitudinal data from the South, we provide evidence that speaks to the daunting challenges facing the Democratic Party in the South. We also address the results in the South's 2006 midterm elections. The findings suggest that as the United States' most reliably Republican region continues to change, Democrats may have an exceedingly difficult time winning statewide races.

Since the 1970s, American politics has taken an impressive turn away from political dealignment and moved toward a more responsible party system. As a result, elections have become more nationalized, a process by which presidential and national politics exert greater influence over down-ballot contests. We evaluate nationalization in electoral contests for two high-profile offices—U.S. Senate and governor—that encompass the same constituencies but constitute markedly different job descriptions and mandated responsibilities. Our analysis utilizes both macro- and micro-level data (election returns and surveys, respectively) to assess patterns of nationalization in these elections. Although it is perhaps not surprising that the linkage between presidential and senatorial contests has tightened, it appears national political forces now also exert greater influence over gubernatorial contests. Nonetheless, we do find regional variation in the nationalization of senatorial and gubernatorial politics, which is more evident in the latter office.

While the effects of legal and institutional arrangements on political participation are well documented, little attention has been given to the potential participatory effects of one of the United States' most important electoral laws: constitutionally mandated reapportionment. By severing the ties between constituents and their incumbents, we argue, redistricting raises information costs, leading to increased levels of nonvoting in U.S. House contests. Survey data from the 1992 American National Election Studies show that redrawn citizens are half as likely to know their incumbent's name as citizens who remain in a familiar incumbent's district and, consequently, significantly more likely to roll off, or abstain from voting in the House election after having cast a presidential vote. We also show that participation rates in the [2002][2003][2004][2005][2006] House elections in Texas-each of which followed a redistricting-match these patterns, with roll-off increasing 3% to 8% in portions of the state that were redrawn, controlling for other factors. The findings demonstrate that scholars and policy makers ought to be concerned with the extent to which the redrawing of congressional lines affects citizens' exercise of political voice.

In political science, urban politics is a well-established subfield. And more recently, suburban political behavior has received a fair amount of attention (Gainsborough 2001; 2005; McKee and Shaw 2003; Oliver 2001). But with a few exceptions (see Francia and Baumgartner 2005–2006; Gimpel and Karnes 2006), the political behavior of rural residents has been conspicuously absent thus far in a growing literature on the political role of place. This is quite surprising given the clamoring in the popular press about “red states” versus “blue states” in the most recent presidential contests. All of the post-presidential election maps that highlight red Republican counties and blue Democratic counties display a sea of red covering the vast swaths of rural, middle America. The ocean of Republican red is enough to make one ask: What's the Matter with Kansas? (Frank 2004)—one of those thinly populated plains states with hardly a glimmer of blue on a county-level map of the 2004 presidential election.