The paradox of legal harmonization

Carbonara, Emanuela; Parisi, Francesco

doi:10.1007/s11127-007-9162-0

Cited by 66 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…We interpret the Euclidean distance ‖x i − x j ‖ as the degree of similarity or compatibility between x i and x j (the "legal distance" in Carbonara and Parisi, 2007). For multifaceted policies composed of a large number of discrete components, the distance between two policies can be interpreted as the number, or the proportion of (possibly weighted) items on which they differ (see Kox et al, 2005 andCarbonara andParisi, 2007). The welfare of the citizens of jurisdiction i is given by:…”

Section: Policies and Preferencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In line with Carbonara and Parisi (2007) or Baniak and Grazl (2009), in this section we assume that the welfare of jurisdictions, as specified in Eq. (1), is differentiable and strictly convex in x.…”

Section: Decentralization Theoremsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On legal convergence, see Berman (1965) on international sales law, Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) on corporate governance, Legrand (1996) on the E.U. and Smythe (2008) on the uniform sales act in the U.S. Garoupa and Ogus (2006) and Carbonara and Parisi (2007) propose game-theoretic models of legal convergence.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Coordination in Heterogeneous Federal Systems

Loeper

2011

SSRN Journal

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We compare centralized and decentralized policy making in a federation in which policy heterogeneity is inherently costly and preferences vary across jurisdictions: all jurisdictions agree that some harmonization is desirable but no one agrees on the direction of harmonization. This type of collective choice problem arises when members of a federal system have to coordinate nonbudgetary policies such as laws, regulations, standards, or diplomatic policies. Contrary to the common wisdom, decentralization becomes optimal when coordination becomes very important. When coordination costs are symmetric, decentralization dominates centralization irrespective of the magnitude of externalities and the heterogeneity of preferences. In the case of discontinuous network effects, standardization never Pareto dominates decentralization.

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Section: Policies and Preferencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Decentralization Theoremsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Coordination in Heterogeneous Federal Systems

Loeper

2011

SSRN Journal

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“…For simplicity, we rule out heterogeneity within state. 4 The second term captures the gains from policy coordination.…”

Section: The Federationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Depending on the policy considered, it can embody the legal uncertainty, litigation costs, or sense of unfairness generated by heterogeneous laws; the transaction costs and barriers to trade caused by a fragmented regulatory system; the …xed-cost duplication due to the lack of standardization of public services; or the barriers to mobility 4 Intrastate preferences heterogneity would not change the results of the paper if we assume that votes are aggregated at the federal level through the "one state one vote" rule, i. 7 push for more decentralization, the reason being that the centrifugal pressures of the latter group have typically diverse motives.…”

Section: The Federationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Federal Directives, Local Discretion and the Majority Rule

Loeper

2012

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe consider a federation in which citizens determine by federal majority rule a discretionary policy space which partially restricts the sovereignty of member states.Citizens …rst vote on the size of the discretionary space (the degree of local discretion), and then on its location on the policy space (the federal directive). Finally, each state votes on its respective policy within the discretionary space. This federal mechanism allows voters to express directly their trade-o¤ between ‡exibility and policy harmonization.We show that at the voting equilibrium, the federal directive is negatively sensitive to the preferences of nonmedian voters. Moreover, the degree of local discretion is too limited and insu¢ ciently sensitive to the magnitude of externalities. Hence, the model shows that inadequate and excessively rigid federal interventions can emerge from a neutral and democratic decision process without agency costs or informational imperfections.JEL Classi…cation Numbers: H77, D72

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The Theoretical Framework for International and Regional Unification and Harmonisation of the Public-Private Partnership Legislation Through Model Laws

Chikanayev

2023

European Yearbook of International Economic Law

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The paradox of legal harmonization

Abstract: Legal harmonization, Legal transplantation, Transnational contracts, Legal change, K10, K33, D70,

Cited by 66 publications

References 15 publications

Coordination in Heterogeneous Federal Systems

Coordination in Heterogeneous Federal Systems

Federal Directives, Local Discretion and the Majority Rule

The Theoretical Framework for International and Regional Unification and Harmonisation of the Public-Private Partnership Legislation Through Model Laws

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