Coordination in Heterogeneous Federal Systems

Loeper, Antoine

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2361025

Cited by 13 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 57 publications

(50 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Proposition 5 indicates that when it is more valuable to pursue policy harmonization, countries may voluntarily do so even without coordination. Interestingly, this result resonates with that in Loeper (2011) who shows in a different context that local jurisdictions would unilaterally enforce harmonization when coordination externalities are large enough.…”

Section: Country a Chooses The Lenient Standard While Country B Impossupporting

confidence: 75%

International Agreements on Product Standards Under Consumption Externalities: National Treatment Versus Mutual Recognition

Geng

2019

Economic Inquiry

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper provides a comparative analysis of product standards agreements between heterogeneous countries. A simple model of vertical standards is developed where countries have heterogeneous preferences for a negative or positive consumption externality. I compare two major types of standards agreements, those based on national treatment (NT) and mutual recognition (MR). Unlike NT, MR can induce a mismatch of standards between countries, a problem that tends to get worse as country preferences diverge. Due to this mismatch problem, NT tends to become relatively more welfare‐enhancing than MR for countries with more dissimilar preferences. These findings explain why the World Trade Organization, the Trans‐Pacific Partnership, and the European Union choose different types of standards agreements. The paper also sheds new light on the desirability of international harmonization of product standards. (JEL F13, F18, O24)

show abstract

Section: Country a Chooses The Lenient Standard While Country B Impossupporting

confidence: 75%

International Agreements on Product Standards Under Consumption Externalities: National Treatment Versus Mutual Recognition

Geng

2019

Economic Inquiry

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…4) findings is congruent with a subset of our results (see our Section 6.1) in that decentralization can dominate uniformization when the world is (in our terminology) structurally symmetric. There are, however, several notable differences between Loeper's (2009) and our analysis, both in approach and in scope. First and foremost, Loeper (2009) employs a full-information framework; we explore a framework where local conditions are jurisdictions' private information.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 86%

“…Finally, Loeper (2009) has independently developed a model in structure similar to ours to contrast non-cooperative policy decentralization with "uniformization". The spirit of a subset of Loeper's (2009: Sec.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Such approach allows us to characterize a richer set of patterns of interjurisdictional linkages, as well as provide a welfare ranking of three distinct institutional regimes. Third, Loeper (2009) extends his basic framework to investigate the rationale for centralized uniformization in the presence of network effects, an aspect of analysis which is beyond the scope of our paper.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…2 Yet in spite of the increasing interest in legal harmonization, formal normative analyses of the subject are scant. Only a handful of contributions have examined conditions under which interventionist harmonization, orchestrated by a supra-jurisdictional authority, is socially desirable (see, e.g., Garoupa and Ogus 2006, Monheim Helstroffer and Obidzinski 2010, Ulph 2000, Loeper 2009). Moreover, the existing analyses have, as we argue in Section 2, with the exception of Loeper (2009), all studied the scope for interventionist harmonization within a stylized two-jurisdiction framework.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Interjurisdictional Linkages and the Scope for Interventionist Legal Harmonization

Baniak¹,

Grajzl²

2011

Review of Law &Amp; Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We study the desirability of interventionist harmonization of legal standards across multiple, mutually interdependent jurisdictions which strive to adapt law to their local conditions as well as to synchronize it with other jurisdictions. In a setting where jurisdictions are privately informed about their local conditions, we contrast the regime of decentralized standard-setting with two means of interventionist harmonization: through centralization and through allocation of lawmaking authority to a particular jurisdiction. Our analysis illuminates the importance of patterns of interjurisdictional linkages in delineating the scope for, and the appropriate means of, interventionist harmonization. We find that greater jurisdictional interdependence -the hallmark of globalization -per se does not justify interventionist harmonization unless increased interdependence results in notable asymmetries in the pattern of jurisdictional interdependence. We also show that, in the presence of cross-jurisdictional externalities, harmonization is, contrary to conventional predictions, not desirable when local preferences are homogeneous across jurisdictions. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Code: D02, D82, K40, P50.

show abstract

The economic effects of political disintegration: Lessons from Serbia and Montenegro

Monastiriotis

Žilić

2020

European Journal of Political Economy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Is there an economic premium from state independence? We shed light on this question by analysing the unique historical case of the peaceful separation of Serbia and Montenegro in 2006-the last fully recognised internationally state-disintegration on European soil. Using the synthetic control approach, we find that independence for the seceding country (Montenegro) had a sizeable but transitory positive effect, boosting GDP per capita in the period immediately following independence, but with gains slowly evaporating in the longer periodwhich we attribute to increased vulnerability of the newly independent state to fluctuations in the international economic environment. In contrast, for Serbia, we find no evidence of an independence dividend. While these results are context-specific, the resemblance of Serbia and Montenegro's case with the contemporaneous independence movements in Europe, namely in the realm of policy autonomy pre-separation, provide insights on possible economic outcomes of secessions on the national and supra-national level in Europe.

show abstract

Coordination in Heterogeneous Federal Systems

Cited by 13 publications

References 57 publications

International Agreements on Product Standards Under Consumption Externalities: National Treatment Versus Mutual Recognition

International Agreements on Product Standards Under Consumption Externalities: National Treatment Versus Mutual Recognition

Interjurisdictional Linkages and the Scope for Interventionist Legal Harmonization

The economic effects of political disintegration: Lessons from Serbia and Montenegro

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About