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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may DUALITY IN PROPERTY: COMMONS AND ANTICOMMONSABSTRACT: Commons and Anticommons problems are the consequence of symmetric structural departures from a unified conception of property. In this paper, we endeavor to provide a dual model of property, where commons and anticommons problems are the consequence of a lack of conformity between use and exclusion rights. The general model is then extended to consider the different equilibria obtained under vertical and horizontal cases of property fragmentation. The paper concludes with a hypothesis of legal rules for promoting unity in property and suggests a list of possible areas of application.A new term of art has recently gained acceptance among law and economics scholars of property law: the anticommons. The concept, first introduced by Michelmann (1982) and then made popular by Heller (1998 and, is a mirror-image -in name and in fact -of Hardin's (1968) well known tragedy of the commons.In situations where multiple individuals are endowed with the privilege to use a given resource without a cost effective way to monitor and constrain each other's use, the resource is vulnerable to overuse: a problem known as the tragedy of the commons.Symmetrically, when multiple owners hold rights to exclude others from a scarce resource and no one exercises an effective privilege of use, the resource might be prone to underuse: a problem known as the tragedy of the anticommons.We build upon this definition of the anticommons, which still lacks an accepted general formalization in the literature. We endeavor to provide a dual model of property, where commons and anticommons problems are shown to result from symmetrical structural departures from a unified conception of property. Specifically, both problems result from a lack of conformity between use and exclusion rights. 4 We then extend the basic model to consider vertical and 4 In a related paper, we utilize this conception of unified property to explain the rise and fall of functional conceptions 2 asymmetric forms of anticommons. We conclude by exploring possible applications of the concept of anticommons and highlighting the relevant policy implications in the choice of rules for minimizing the social cost of non-conforming property arrangements. Commons and Anticommons: Two Tragedies on Common GroundBoth commons and anticommons problems result from a misalignment of private and social incentives of two or more individuals i...

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Probabilistic abstract argumentation combines Dung's abstract argumentation framework with probability theory in order to model uncertainty in argumentation. In this setting, we address the fundamental problem of computing the probability that a set of arguments is an extension according to a given semantics. We focus on the most popular semantics (i.e., admissible, stable, complete, grounded, preferred, ideal-set, ideal, stage, and semistable) and show the following dichotomy result: computing the probability that a set of arguments is an extension is either FP or FP #P -complete depending on the semantics adopted. Our polynomial-time results are particularly interesting, as they hold for some semantics for which no polynomial-time technique was known so far.