The Localized and Spatial Effects of US Troop Deployments on Host-State Defense Spending

Allen, Michael; VanDusky-Allen, Julie; Flynn, Michael E.

doi:10.1111/fpa.12078

Cited by 13 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 46 publications

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“…Lastly, US military deployments correlate with improved human rights practices by some host-state governments (Bell, Clay and Machain 2016). Building on this work, Allen, Flynn and VanDusky-Allen (2014) argue that the effect of military deployments on security tradeoffs depends on the size of the deployments, but also on power disparities and the institutional context of security relationships between the US and sub-ordinate states. They find that for many states there is a negative relationship between the size of US troop deployments and the host-state's defense burden.…”

Section: Security Troop Deployments and Host-state Foreign Policymentioning

confidence: 87%

“…As in previous studies (see Allen, Flynn and VanDusky-Allen 2014;Lake 2009a; Martinez Machain and Morgan 2013), we use troop deployments as a proxy for the extent to which the US offers security to states. We assume that by placing troops in other states, the US is creating hierarchical relationships with those host-states whereby the host-state cedes autonomy over its foreign policy in exchange for security provided by the US.…”

Section: A Theory Of Spatial Hierarchymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A state's defense burden serves as an indicator of the extent to which states are channeling available resources into the pursuit of international goals. Previous studies have used this as an indicator of foreign policy autonomy, finding that when subordinate states cede foreign policy authority to the US, they reduce their defense burden and allocate resources to other policy areas in which they exercises more control (Allen, Flynn and VanDusky-Allen 2014). Hence, we use defense burdens to measure how much a state concedes sovereignty to the US.…”

Section: A Theory Of Spatial Hierarchymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Regions of Hierarchy and Security: US Troop Deployments, Spatial Relations, and Defense Burdens

Allen

Flynn

VanDusky-Allen

2016

International Interactions

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Recent work has begun exploring the effects of foreign military deployments on hoststate foreign policies. However, research mostly focuses on dyadic relationships between major powers and host-states, ignoring the broader regional security environment of host-states. We develop a theory of spatial hierarchies to understand how security relationships throughout the region surrounding the host-state affect hoststate foreign policy. Using data on US military deployments from 1950-2005, we show that regional security considerations condition how host-states respond to the deployment of military forces to their territory. Consequently, regional analyses are fundamental in understanding monadic and dyadic decisions about security, alliance behavior, and conflict.Major powers have a history of deploying their military forces to project power. In spite of their importance, international relations research contains little work on the consequences of such deployments. However, scholars have begun examining a range of issues associated with US military deployments, including economic growth, trade, investment, security policy, conflict behavior, and crime (Martinez Machain and Morgan 2013). While this research area has grown, the role that such deployments play in the regional security environment remains under-explored. Accordingly, interpretations of causality in existing studies is incomplete as the regional context exerts a conditioning effect upon the relationships of interest. Fundamentally, regional security contexts should affect how states respond to the presence of foreign military forces.Herein we examine how US military deployments affect foreign policy decisions. We build upon previous studies by incorporating regional security factors into our theoretical argument and analysis. Using data on US military deployments since 1950, we analyze how US military deployments to a host-state, as well as deployments to third-party states in the region, affect these states' defense spending decisions. Studies typically focus on the host-state's response to US troop deployments in a dyadic fashion, evaluating how US deployments affect the host-state's military spending or conflict propensity (e.g. Allen, Flynn and VanDusky-Allen 2014; Lake 2009a; Martinez Machain and Morgan 2013). This approach assumes that the effects of US military deployments on a particular state are independent of military deployments in neighboring states and the regional security environment. * The authors would like to thank David Lake, Pat Shea, Carla Martinez Machain, Chad Clay, the editorial team at International Interactions, and two anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions. Replication files can be found at the International Interactions Dataverse page: http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/internationalinteractions. Questions regarding replication materials can be directed to meflynn@ksu.edu. 2This variable is the sum of the CINC scores for pairs of states with an S score that is less than the global median S score, calculated for al...

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Section: Security Troop Deployments and Host-state Foreign Policymentioning

confidence: 87%

Section: A Theory Of Spatial Hierarchymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Theory Of Spatial Hierarchymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Regions of Hierarchy and Security: US Troop Deployments, Spatial Relations, and Defense Burdens

Allen

Flynn

VanDusky-Allen

2016

International Interactions

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“…In addition, states that are hosts to US troops may be more likely to engage in bellicose behavior, initiating more militarized disputes (Martinez Machain and Morgan 2013) and (in the case of North Atlantic Treaty Organization states) increasing their levels of defense spending (Allen, Flynn, and VanDusky-Allen 2014). Beyond this behavior, some have argued that hosting these troops associates a state with the US, potentially making the host state a target of attack from actors hostile to the US (Lutz 2009).…”

Section: The Consequences Of Us Troop Deploymentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effect of US Troop Deployments on Human Rights

Bell

Clay

Machain

2016

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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US noninvasion troops deployed abroad often try to promote greater respect for human rights in the host country. The host country, having an incentive to retain the troop presence, may choose to comply with these requests. We argue that this effect will not be at play in states with high security salience for the United States (US) (for which the US may not be able to credibly threaten to remove the troops). In these cases, US deployments will provide the leader with security from both internal and external threats that is independent of the local population's support for the leader. Host state leaders thus become less reliant on (and potentially less responsive to) their local populations, which in turn may lead to increased human rights violations. In this article, we use data on both US troop deployments abroad and on human rights violations to test these arguments from 1982 to 2005.

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“…Operating closer to the theme of the present study, Machain and Morgan (2013) find that increased levels of U.S. troops, which function as a tripwire that bolsters U.S. commitments to provide for its ally's security and defense, somewhat reduce the hosts' own troop levels. Two recent contributions by Michael Allen and colleagues apply a related focus (Allen, Flynn, & VanDusky-Allen, 2017;Allen, VanDusky-Allen, & Flynn, 2016): They investigate how U.S. troop deployments affect the defense burden (operationalized as military expenditures) of hosts. They find that the effects are conditional both on U.S. troops deployment in neighboring countries and on the tightness of the security relationship between the United States and the host in question.…”

Section: Us Bases Overseas Troops and Burden-sharingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tripwires and free-riders: Do forward-deployed U.S. troops reduce the willingness of host-country citizens to fight for their country?

Jakobsen

2018

Contemporary Security Policy

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This article investigates the relationship between U.S. overseas troops and the willingness of the citizens of host states to fight for their country. The study joins the long-running debate about burden-sharing and free-riding among U.S. allies. Unlike most previous empirical studies, we focus on non-material or intangible measures of the underlying concepts. Our dependent variable estimates the proportion of citizens expressing a willingness to fight for their country. Scores at the aggregate-national as well as the individual level are shaped by the presence of U.S. military forces, which act as a "tripwire" signaling credible security commitments. This increases opportunities of (nonmaterial) free-riding. We present both bivariate and multivariate analyses covering the period 1981-2014 to test this supposition. Findings indicate that once U.S. troop levels reach a certain threshold (between 100 and 500 troops), citizens' willingness to fight drops significantly. This likely reflects non-material free-riding. KEYWORDS Willingness to fight; U.S. troops; free-riding; burden-sharing; tripwire; U.S. military bases This article investigates to what extent the war willingness of a country's citizens, through processes of non-material or intangible "free-riding," is affected by the stationing of U.S. troops in that country. We will thus shed some light on the recent and ongoing debate about burden-sharing and free-riding among allies of the United States (Dombrowski & Reich, 2017; Kaufman, 2017). Current U.S. President Donald Trump has certainly ratcheted up the rhetoric on this issue, consistently lamenting the lack of defense efforts by allies and even issuing ambiguous threats to withdraw from alliance commitments unless defense efforts are shared more equitably (New York Times, 2017). Still, the debate represents nothing new; claims of free-riding (and counter-claims as well) have for decades affected Washington's alliance relationships (Ringsmose,

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The Localized and Spatial Effects of US Troop Deployments on Host-State Defense Spending

Cited by 13 publications

References 46 publications

Regions of Hierarchy and Security: US Troop Deployments, Spatial Relations, and Defense Burdens

Regions of Hierarchy and Security: US Troop Deployments, Spatial Relations, and Defense Burdens

The Effect of US Troop Deployments on Human Rights

Tripwires and free-riders: Do forward-deployed U.S. troops reduce the willingness of host-country citizens to fight for their country?

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