SUMMARY Some claim that when level of property rights protection is controlled, democracy lowers foreign direct investment (FDI) to developing countries (Li and Resnick 2003). We critically examine the theoretical claims of the pessimistic arguments and show that FDI responds to preferences of countries and that democracies have a clear preference for FDI given that the scarce factor – capital – will find it harder under democracy to seek rents by raising barriers to entry. On the other hand, labor (the abundant factor in developing countries) should profit from lower barriers to capital importation. We demonstrate conclusively that the most prominent pessimistic result on democracy in the literature is simply an artefact of sample size and testing procedure. We establish robust evidence suggesting that developing country democracies actually receive higher inflows of FDI, net of a number of control variables. Consistent with our view that host nations' attitudes are shaped by factor endowments, which in turn determine rent‐seeking, we demonstrate that governments controlled by ‘leftist’ political parties also receive more FDI than ‘centrist’ or ‘rightist’ governments among democracies. Why this should be true is not obvious from a theory based on property rights risk alone. An extended sample of LDCs and a better operationalization show that property rights and democracy positively affect FDI. Our results suggest that globalization advances the fortunes of democracies in the developing world.

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Empirical studies on the causes of civil war robustly show that poor countries are more likely to suffer civil war than rich ones. However, the interpretations of this finding differ. The literature proposes three different causal mechanisms: (1) poverty leads to grievances; (2) income proxies the opportunity-cost of rebelling; and (3) income proxies state capacity. Using factor analysis, logistic modeling and multiple imputation, we test which of the three possible explanations can best explain the link between poverty and conflict. We find per capita income to belong to a wealth/poverty dimension, and to have little in common with "pure" measures of grievance and state capacity. Thus our findings support the opportunity-cost argument. The wealth dimension is also shown to be the most important underlying cause of civil war.

Whether or not a city or a country should bid to host the Olympics or one of the big international football tournaments is often the source of heated debates. One question that is always raised is whether hosting such an event yields positive economic benefits. Using data from the period 1970-2009 we investigate whether there is a link between hosting a major sport event and the amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) a country receives. We employ time-series cross-section data for countries that have hosted either the Summer Olympics, the Winter Olympics, the FIFA World Cup or the UEFA European Championship in that period. While our overall results, on balance, offer support to the 'pessimistic' side of the debate about the economic effects of hosting mega events, our findings also indicate that some FDI benefits might still accrue to the host. Results are not unambiguous, however. More detailed analysis suggests that staging the Olympics has virtually no effect on FDI inflows, whereas hosting a major, nationwide football tournament might have a small positive impact on foreign investment, particularly in the years leading up to the event. These latter results seem to be driven by smaller nations.

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This article analyses the international migrations and statuses of people who left Syria after the outbreak of the civil war. In addition to exploring the dynamics of Syrian refugee migrations since 2011, we also discuss future prospects and possibilities of return. The ambition of the article is twofold. First, we aim to develop and nuance the typology of migrations of Syrians. Secondly, the article seeks to explore useful lessons from former large-scale refugee migrations; that is, knowledge which may hopefully contribute to preparing the relevant institutions and organisations for Syrian migrations in the eventual post-war period. Based on experiences from other post-conflict situations, several possible future scenarios of Syrian migrations are discussed. The proposed typologies of migrants and repatriation regimes may help us understand the nuances, the dynamic of status change and the complexity of the forced migrations. It is maintained that migration trends, reception, and repatriation conditions and policies are highly interconnected. Refugees’ responses to reception and repatriation regimes result in transitions in their legal statuses in receiving countries and changing motivations for migration and repatriation.

The democratic peace literature has convincingly shown that democracies do not fight other democracies. Theoretical explanations of this empirical phenomenon often claim that the citizenry in democracies prefers peaceful resolution of interstate conflicts. Still, there is a dearth of studies exploring the public's preferences and values directly. We seek to rectify this by investigating, in a novel way, the relationship between regime type and citizens' bellicosity. A comprehensive multilevel research design is employed, with data spanning 72 countries over the period . This enables us to test one of the theoretical mainstays of the democratic peace thesis, viz., that regime type helps shape individuals' attitudes toward war-fighting. Our results lend special support to normative democratic peace theory: Citizens of democracies are significantly more pacifistic than citizens of non-democracies. This result upholds when we rigorously control for other relevant factors, including specific characteristics of individuals and rival theoretical explanations.

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