Regions of Hierarchy and Security: US Troop Deployments, Spatial Relations, and Defense Burdens

Abstract

Recent work has begun exploring the effects of foreign military deployments on hoststate foreign policies. However, research mostly focuses on dyadic relationships between major powers and host-states, ignoring the broader regional security environment of host-states. We develop a theory of spatial hierarchies to understand how security relationships throughout the region surrounding the host-state affect hoststate foreign policy. Using data on US military deployments from 1950-2005, we show that regional security considerations condition how host-states respond to the deployment of military forces to their territory. Consequently, regional analyses are fundamental in understanding monadic and dyadic decisions about security, alliance behavior, and conflict.Major powers have a history of deploying their military forces to project power. In spite of their importance, international relations research contains little work on the consequences of such deployments. However, scholars have begun examining a range of issues associated with US military deployments, including economic growth, trade, investment, security policy, conflict behavior, and crime (Martinez Machain and Morgan 2013). While this research area has grown, the role that such deployments play in the regional security environment remains under-explored. Accordingly, interpretations of causality in existing studies is incomplete as the regional context exerts a conditioning effect upon the relationships of interest. Fundamentally, regional security contexts should affect how states respond to the presence of foreign military forces.Herein we examine how US military deployments affect foreign policy decisions. We build upon previous studies by incorporating regional security factors into our theoretical argument and analysis. Using data on US military deployments since 1950, we analyze how US military deployments to a host-state, as well as deployments to third-party states in the region, affect these states' defense spending decisions. Studies typically focus on the host-state's response to US troop deployments in a dyadic fashion, evaluating how US deployments affect the host-state's military spending or conflict propensity (e.g. Allen, Flynn and VanDusky-Allen 2014; Lake 2009a; Martinez Machain and Morgan 2013). This approach assumes that the effects of US military deployments on a particular state are independent of military deployments in neighboring states and the regional security environment. * The authors would like to thank David Lake, Pat Shea, Carla Martinez Machain, Chad Clay, the editorial team at International Interactions, and two anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions. Replication files can be found at the International Interactions Dataverse page: http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/internationalinteractions. Questions regarding replication materials can be directed to meflynn@ksu.edu. 2This variable is the sum of the CINC scores for pairs of states with an S score that is less than the global median S score, calculated for al...

Outside the Wire: U.S. Military Deployments and Public Opinion in Host States

“…Scholars have long debated the effect of such deployments in terms of state-to-state relations (Davis 2011; Harkavy 1989; Ikenberry 2004; Lake 2009a; Wohlforth 1999) and specific political, economic, and social outcomes (Allen, Flynn, and VanDusky-Allen 2017; Braithwaite and Kucik 2017; Bell, Clay, and Martinez Machain 2017; Biglaiser and DeRouen Jr 2009; Heo and Ye 2017; Jones and Kane 2012; Martinez Machain and Morgan 2013; Nieman 2016). Related to the concept of hierarchy, some argue that the maintenance of a large overseas presence has been crucial to sustaining the liberal international economic order (Ikenberry 2011; Lake 2009b).…”

Tripwires and free-riders: Do forward-deployed U.S. troops reduce the willingness of host-country citizens to fight for their country?

“…Operating closer to the theme of the present study, Machain and Morgan (2013) find that increased levels of U.S. troops, which function as a tripwire that bolsters U.S. commitments to provide for its ally's security and defense, somewhat reduce the hosts' own troop levels. Two recent contributions by Michael Allen and colleagues apply a related focus (Allen, Flynn, & VanDusky-Allen, 2017;Allen, VanDusky-Allen, & Flynn, 2016): They investigate how U.S. troop deployments affect the defense burden (operationalized as military expenditures) of hosts. They find that the effects are conditional both on U.S. troops deployment in neighboring countries and on the tightness of the security relationship between the United States and the host in question.…”

Before the dominos fall: Regional conflict, donor interests, and US foreign aid

“…Where neighboring states are drawn into conflicts we should see them increase military expenditures, as the use of force requires countries to replenish ammunition, replace or fix equipment that is damaged or destroyed, provide medical treatment to soldiers who are injured, etc. (Allen et al, 2016, b; Fordham and Walker, 2005; Phillips, 2015). However, Phillips (2015) finds that states increase military spending when a conflict in a neighboring state reaches a shared border, even when the referent state itself is not directly involved in the conflict.…”

“…Second, troop deployments can serve a function similar to alliances. US military personnel can be deployed to states for a variety of reasons, the most prominent being the provision of security for the host state (Allen et al, 2016, b; Lake, 2009). US military personnel can also deploy to other states to train host-state military personnel in tactics and to improve civil–military relations (Bell et al, 2016).…”

“…Studies have shown how spatial considerations affect states’ policymaking (e.g. Allen et al, 2016, b). If donor governments use foreign aid to support friendly regimes or to promote market access, then it stands to reason that the recipient state’s potential or actual exposure to conflict should influence donor decisions.…”