The History of Science as a Graveyard of Theories: A Philosophers’ Myth?

Abstract

Abstract. According to the antirealist argument known as the pessimistic induction, the history of science is a graveyard of dead scientific theories and abandoned theoretical posits. Support for this pessimistic picture of the history of science usually comes from a few case histories, such as the demise of the phlogiston theory and the abandonment of caloric as the substance of heat. In this paper, I wish to take a new approach to examining the "history of science as a graveyard of theories" picture. Using JSTOR Data for Research and Springer Exemplar, I present new lines of evidence that are at odds with this pessimistic picture of the history of science. When rigorously tested against the historical record of science, I submit, the pessimistic picture of the history of science as a graveyard of dead theories and abandoned posits may turn out to be no more than a philosophers' myth.

An Absurd Consequence of Stanford’s New Induction Over the History of Science: A Reply to Sterpetti

“…As far as Premise 1 is concerned, it is far from obvious that, in general, scientific theories routinely change. Some scientific theories and theoretical posits are quite stable and have been around for more than two centuries (Mizrahi 2016c). Also, how much does a scientific theory have to change such that it becomes difficult (impossible?)…”

The Case Study Method in Philosophy of Science: An Empirical Study

“…This "graveyard picture" is generally accepted by philosophers of science despite the fact that it is based merely on isolated cases studies of theories (e.g., the caloric theory of heat) and theoretical posits (e.g., phlogiston) that were discarded. In addition to the research conducted for the present paper, Mizrahi (2016) is another example of how using the tools of data science in Philosophy of Science can lead to interesting and illuminating results; in other words, how "knowledge can be extracted from data without reliance on preconceived hypotheses" (Leonelli 2016, p. 1), such as the "graveyard" hypothesis. 17…”

Historical Inductions Meet the Material Theory

“…Laudan (1981) suggests that the history of science contains a graveyard of theories that were previously believed to be approximately true and genuinely referential, but that subsequently were judged to be false and not to refer. Estimations of the number of such superseded theories have been debated (e.g., Lewis 2001, Wray 2013 and recently Mizrahi (2016) presents evidence that challenges the "history of science as a graveyard of theories" claim. Others voice concerns regarding the period of history of science used in order to extract historical evidence (e.g., Lange 2002, Fahrbach 2011 or the proper unit of analysis, i.e., theories vs. theoretical entity (e.g., Lange 2002, Magnus andCallender 2004).…”

“…This is so even if, say, the historical data was not cherrypicked, and the right unit of analysis and correct period of history were used. In other words, I'm equally skeptic of projects that attempt to block the pessimistic conclusion by, for example, taking a random sample of past scientific theories, e.g., Mizrahi (2016). In the following section I'll attempt to extend such claims to the problem of unconceived alternatives.…”