An Absurd Consequence of Stanford’s New Induction Over the History of Science: A Reply to Sterpetti

Mizrahi, Moti

doi:10.1007/s10516-019-09424-3

Axiomathes

2019

DOI: 10.1007/s10516-019-09424-3

|View full text |Cite|

An Absurd Consequence of Stanford’s New Induction Over the History of Science: A Reply to Sterpetti

Moti Mizrahi

Abstract: In this paper, I respond to Fabio Sterpetti's (2018) attempt to defend Kyle P. Stanford's Problem of Unconceived Alternatives (PUA) and his New Induction over the History of Science (NIS) from my reductio argument outlined in Mizrahi (2016a). I discuss what I take to be the ways in which Sterpetti has misconstrued my argument against Stanford's NIS, in particular, that it is a reductio, not a dilemma, as Sterpetti erroneously thinks. I argue that antirealists who endorse Stanford's NIS still face an absurd con… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...

Citation Types

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Year Published

2020

Publication Types

Select...

Book1

Relationship

Self Cite1

Independent0

Authors

Journals

Cited by 1 publication

References 18 publications

(12 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

Key Arguments Against Scientific Realism

Mizrahi

2020

Synthese Library

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this chapter, I present in canonical (or standard) form and then evaluate key arguments against scientific realism (or for antirealism about science). The first argument is known as the “ pessimistic induction” or the “pessimistic meta-induction.” In its original formulation, attributed to Larry Laudan (Philos Sci 48(1):19–49, 1981), the argument is based on a list of theories that are supposed to be counterexamples to the realist thesis that empirical success is a mark of (approximate) truth. Other formulations of the argument have it as an inductive argument from a sample of theories that were discarded in the past to the conclusion that our present scientific theories will probably be discarded as well. The second argument is a positive argument for Bas van Fraassen’s (The scientific image. Oxford University Press, New York, 1980) antirealist position, namely, Constructive Empiricism. The third argument proceeds from the observation that scientists cannot claim to be in a privileged epistemic position. According to this argument, it is unlikely that our best scientific theories are (approximately) true because scientists are not especially skilled at developing theories that are likely true or approximately true. A contemporary proponent of this argument for antirealism is Brad Wray (Int Stud Philos Sci 22(3):317–326, 2008). The fourth is an argument for antirealism from what Kyle Stanford (Exceeding our grasp: science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives. Oxford University Press, New York, 2006) calls the “Problem of Unconceived Alternatives” (PUA). According to Stanford, the historical record of science reveals that past scientists typically failed to conceive of alternatives to their favorite, then-successful theories. This is supposed to make it more likely that present scientists fail to conceive of alternatives to their favorite, now-successful theories. For these reasons, Stanford argues, we should not believe our present scientific theories are (approximately) true. The fifth argument purports to show that many of the scientific theories we currently accept will be discarded sometime in the future, as the “ pessimistic induction” does, but it proceeds from the premise that the research goals and interests of scientists change over time (Wray, Brad K., Resisting scientific realism. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018).

show abstract

Key Arguments Against Scientific Realism

Mizrahi

2020

Synthese Library

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.

Contact Info

hi@scite.ai

10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614

Henderson, NV 89052, USA

Blog Terms and Conditions API Terms Privacy Policy Contact Cookie Preferences Do Not Sell or Share My Personal Information

Made with 💙 for researchers

Part of the Research Solutions Family.

An Absurd Consequence of Stanford’s New Induction Over the History of Science: A Reply to Sterpetti

Cited by 1 publication

References 18 publications

Key Arguments Against Scientific Realism

Key Arguments Against Scientific Realism

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About