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Abstract:In this paper, I consider the pessimistic induction construed as a deductive argument (specifically, reductio ad absurdum) and as an inductive argument (specifically, inductive generalization). I argue that both formulations of the pessimistic induction are fallacious. I also consider another possible interpretation of the pessimistic induction, namely, as pointing to counterexamples to the scientific realist's thesis that success is a reliable mark of (approximate) truth. I argue that this interpretation of the pessimistic induction fails, too. If this is correct, then the pessimistic induction is an utter failure that should be abandoned by scientific anti-realists.

Abstract:In this paper, I argue that arguments from expert opinion, i.e., inferences from "Expert E says that p" to "p," where the truth value of p is unknown, are weak arguments. A weak argument is an argument in which the premises, even if true, provide weak support-or no support at all-for the conclusion. Such arguments from expert opinion are weak arguments unless the fact that an expert says that p makes p significantly more likely to be true. However, research on expertise shows that expert opinions are only slightly more accurate than chance and much less accurate than decision procedures. If this is correct, then it follows that arguments from expert opinion are weak arguments.Résumé:: Dans cet article, je soutiens que les arguments fondés sur l'opinion des experts, à savoir, les inférences de "Expert E dit que p" à "p", où la valeur de vérité de p est inconnue, sont faibles. Un argument faible est un argument dans lequel les prémisses, même si elles sont vraies, fournissent un soutien faible ou aucun soutien du tout pour la conclusion. De tels arguments sont faibles à moins que l'affirmation d'un expert que p rende p significativement plus susceptibles d'être vrai. Cependant, la recherche sur l'expertise montre que les opinions des experts ne sont que légère-ment plus exactes que les opinons énoncées au hasard et beaucoup moins exactes que les procédures de décision. Si cela est vrai, il s'ensuit que les arguments fondés sur les opinions des experts sont faibles.

The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate over the nature of scientific progress in philosophy of science by taking a quantitative, corpus-based approach. By employing the methods of data science and corpus linguistics, the following philosophical accounts of scientific progress are tested empirically: the semantic account of scientific progress (i.e., scientific progress in terms of truth), the epistemic account of scientific progress (i.e., scientific progress in terms of knowledge), and the noetic account of scientific progress (i.e., scientific progress in terms of understanding). Overall, the results of this quantitative, corpus-based study lend some empirical support to the epistemic and the noetic accounts over the semantic account of scientific progress, for they suggest that practicing scientists use the terms 'knowledge' and 'understanding' significantly more often than the term 'truth' when they talk about the aims or goals of scientific research in their published works. But the results do not favor the epistemic account over the noetic account, or vice versa, for they reveal no significant differences between the frequency with which practicing scientists use the terms 'knowledge' and 'understanding' when they talk about the aims or goals of scientific research in their published works.

In a recent debate about the nature of scientific progress, Alexander Bird and Darrell Rowbottom have argued for two competing accounts of progress. According to Bird, scientific progress consists in the accumulation of scientific knowledge. Rowbottom, on the other hand, thinks that truth alone is necessary for progress. Both use thought experiments and appeal to intuitions in support of their views, and it seems fair to say that the debate has reached an impasse. In an attempt to avoid this stalemate, I propose to abandon appeals to intuitions and turn to scientific practice instead. I propose to examine the institution of the Nobel Prize, where scientists award their peers for what they consider to be important contributions to science, in order to shed new light on the question of scientific progress. I discuss two case studies that illustrate the way in which scientists make judgments about progress. As far as scientists are concerned, progress is made when scientific discoveries contribute to the increase of scientific knowledge of the following sorts: empirical, theoretical, practical, and methodological. I then propose that we should articulate an account of scientific progress that does justice to the way in which scientists evaluate progress. I discuss one way of doing so, namely, by abandoning the distinction between 'knowing that' and 'knowing how' and granting that know-how counts as scientific knowledge.

Abstract. According to the antirealist argument known as the pessimistic induction, the history of science is a graveyard of dead scientific theories and abandoned theoretical posits. Support for this pessimistic picture of the history of science usually comes from a few case histories, such as the demise of the phlogiston theory and the abandonment of caloric as the substance of heat. In this paper, I wish to take a new approach to examining the "history of science as a graveyard of theories" picture. Using JSTOR Data for Research and Springer Exemplar, I present new lines of evidence that are at odds with this pessimistic picture of the history of science. When rigorously tested against the historical record of science, I submit, the pessimistic picture of the history of science as a graveyard of dead theories and abandoned posits may turn out to be no more than a philosophers' myth.

Philosophy is often divided into two traditions or camps: Analytic Philosophy and Continental Philosophy. Characterizing the so-called "Analytic-Continental divide," however, and explaining the differences between these two philosophical traditions is no easy task. Some philosophers have argued that the differences have to do with the place of argument in the two traditions. This raises the following questions: Is Analytic Philosophy rife with arguments while Continental Philosophy is devoid of arguments? Or can different types of arguments be found in Analytic Philosophy and in Continental Philosophy? If so, which ones? Using data mining and text analysis methods, we study a large corpus of philosophical texts mined from the JSTOR database (n = 53,260) in order to tackle these questions empirically. Using indicator words to classify arguments by type (deductive, inductive, and abductive arguments), we search through our corpus to find patterns of usage. Overall, the results of our empirical study suggest that there are no significant differences between the types of arguments advanced in Analytic Philosophy journal articles and the types of arguments advanced in Continental Philosophy journal articles. In fact, articles published in both AP journals and CP journals contain the three types of arguments we have looked at, namely, deductive, inductive, and abductive arguments, with no significant differences in frequency. Our findings, therefore, provide no empirical support to the hypothesis that the so-called split or divide between Analytic Philosophy and Continental Philosophy has something to do with the place of argument in these two philosophical traditions or camps.

Abstract. In this paper, I argue that arguments from the history of science against scientific realism, like the arguments advanced by Kyle Stanford and Peter Vickers, are fallacious. The socalled "Old Induction," like Vickers', and the so-called "New Induction," like Stanford's, are both guilty of confirmation bias, specifically, of cherry-picking evidence that allegedly challenges scientific realism, while ignoring evidence to the contrary. I also show that the historical episodes Stanford adduces in support of his New Induction are indeterminate between a pessimistic interpretation and an optimistic interpretation. For these reasons, these arguments are fallacious, and thus do not pose a serious challenge to scientific realism.