Historical Inductions: New Cherries, Same Old Cherry-picking

Abstract

Abstract. In this paper, I argue that arguments from the history of science against scientific realism, like the arguments advanced by Kyle Stanford and Peter Vickers, are fallacious. The socalled "Old Induction," like Vickers', and the so-called "New Induction," like Stanford's, are both guilty of confirmation bias, specifically, of cherry-picking evidence that allegedly challenges scientific realism, while ignoring evidence to the contrary. I also show that the historical episodes Stanford adduces in support of his New Induction are indeterminate between a pessimistic interpretation and an optimistic interpretation. For these reasons, these arguments are fallacious, and thus do not pose a serious challenge to scientific realism.

An Absurd Consequence of Stanford’s New Induction Over the History of Science: A Reply to Sterpetti

“…In that respect, it is important to point out that, as I have argued elsewhere, historical inductions, both old, such as Larry Laudan's pessimistic induction (Mizrahi 2013a), and new, such as Stanford's NIS (Mizrahi 2015), are weak inductive arguments. The problems with these historical inductions are that they tend to commit the fallacy of biased statistics (Park 2011), they are based on unrepresentative samples (Fahrbach 2011), and the inductive samples they are based on are typically cherry-picked rather than randomly selected (Mizrahi 2013a).…”

“…Excluding mere logical possibilities, how many "equally well-confirmed and scientifically serious alternatives" (Stanford 2006, p. 44) are there to theories of inheritance, or electricity, or magnetism? A few (Mizrahi 2015), but certainly not so many as to make it impossible to justifiably believe (though not "prove" in the strict sense, as Sterpetti seems to demand) that T has no "equally well-confirmed and scientifically serious alternatives" (Stanford 2006, p. 44). 14 In light of the above, then, it is not clear what Sterpetti has gained from turning Stanford's NIS from an inductive argument over the history of science to a deductive argument (specifically, a reductio).…”

“…Inductive arguments from a sample, such as the NIS, are strong just in case they are based on representative, random samples; otherwise, they are fallacious. SeeMizrahi (2015).…”

Historical Inductions Meet the Material Theory

“…Recently, P. Kyle Stanford (2001Stanford ( , 2006 has developed what may be characterized as a new version of the PMI: … I propose the following New Induction over the History of Science: that we have, throughout the history of scientific inquiry and in virtually every field, repeatedly occupied an epistemic position in which we could conceive of only one or a few theories that were well-confirmed by the available evidence, while subsequent history of inquiry has routinely (if not invariably) revealed further, radically distinct alternatives as well-confirmed by the previously available evidence as those we were inclined to accept on the strength of that evidence. (Stanford 2001, S8-S9) The problem of unconceinved alternatives as an argument against scientific realism has been criticized on various grounds (e.g., Chakravartty 2008, Devitt 2011, Mizrahi 2015, but my goal here is just to note that the discussion of Section 3 can be extended to this new version of the PMI, which can be construed as follows: P(i) In the past time of theory 1, theory 1 was successful but there were unconceived alternative theories that were as well supported by available evidence but with radically different ontology. P(ii) In the past time of theory 2, theory 2 was successful but there were unconceived alternative theories that were as well supported by available evidence but with radically different ontology.…”

“…My goal is to contribute to a growing literature that is critical of historical inductions such as the pessimistic (meta-)induction (PMI) argument (Poincaré 1952, 160;Putnam 1978, 25;Laudan 1981) and the problem of unconceived alternatives (Stanford 2001(Stanford , 2006 against scientific realism, concentrating mostly on the former. The PMI can be construed in different ways (Mizrahi 2015, Wray 2015, viz., as a deductive reductio ad absurdum (e.g., Psillos 1996Psillos , 1999, a counterexample to the no miracles argument and inference to best explanation argument for scientific realism (e.g., Saatsi 2005, Laudan 1981), or, usually, as an inductive argument (e.g., Poincaré 1952, Putnam 1978, Laudan 1981, Rescher 1987. In the following I will argue against the inductive version of PMI-or any construal of the PMI that makes use of historical induction-using John D. Norton's material theory of induction (Norton 2003, Manuscript).…”