Historical Inductions Meet the Material Theory

Shech, Elay

doi:10.1086/705524

Cited by 5 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…Such a realist position is not motivated by wholesale arguments like inference to the best explanation, which support a global thesis about all of science, viz., that we ought to commit to the existence of all theoretical postulates playing a special explanatory role. Instead, a realism that seems viable is a selective, local realism in which our commitment to unobservables is assessed on a case-bycase basis, taking the scientific evidence into account, as has been gestured at by, e.g., Asay (2019), Magnus & Callender (2004), Saatsi (2010), and Shech (2019, 2022. What such realism and anti-realism ultimately amounts to is left for further study.…”

Section: Objections and Conclusionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Darwinian-Selectionist Explanation, Radical Theory Change, and the Observable-Unobservable Dichotomy

Shech

2021

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science

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In his recent 2018 book, Resisting Scientific Realism, K. Brad Wray provides a detailed, fullfledged defense of anti-realism about science. In this paper, I argue against the two main claims that constitute Wray's positive and novel argument for his position, viz., his suggested Darwinian-selectionist explanation of the success of science and his skepticism about unobservables based on radical theory change. My goal is not wholly negative though. Instead, I aim to identify the type of work that an anti-realist like Wray would need to undertake in order to further substantiate their position, viz., taking a stance on inductive inference and support, and the type of realist and anti-realist positions that seem viable.

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Section: Objections and Conclusionmentioning

confidence: 99%