The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?

Abstract

Students of international politics known as 'proliferation optimists' argue that when it comes to the spread of nuclear weapons 'more may be better' because nuclear weapons deter great power war and produce greater levels of international stability. This essay provides a critique of proliferation optimism, challenging optimism's conception of nuclear deterrence theory, its logical underpinnings, and its policy recommendations. It does this by conducting an intellectual history of proliferation optimism, identifying the core weaknesses of proliferation optimism as a theoretical framework, and articulating the myriad threats posed by nuclear proliferation.Should we worry about the spread of nuclear weapons? At first glance, this might appear to be an absurd question. After all, nuclear weapons are the most powerful weapons ever created by humankind. A single nuclear weapon could vaporize large portions of a major metropolitan area, killing millions of people, and a full-scale nuclear war between superpowers could end life on Earth as we know it. For decades during the Cold War, the public feared nuclear war and postapocalyptic nuclear war scenarios became a subject of fascination and terror in popular culture. Meanwhile, scholars carefully theorized the dangers of nuclear weapons and policymakers made nuclear nonproliferation a top national priority.

Beyond deterrence: Uncertain stability in the nuclear era

“…Classical deterrence concludes that persistent terror is the price of peace in the nuclear era. This argument is reflected in the “deterrence/proliferation optimism” during the Cold War and continues to be advanced (Kroenig, 2015).…”

A cultural neuroscience perspective on North Korean strategic culture

“…This approach offers a better understanding of the importance of culturally tailoring signals during crisis management, as well as ways to develop asymmetric methods that offer more freedom of operation. Considering the diversity of nuclear powers in the international system, along with the growing possibility of regional proliferation, 254 sociocultural factors should be incorporated into tailored strategies to improve the overall effectiveness and credibility of deterrence.…”

Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation

“…111 International relations scholars often argue that global stability is the foremost policy goal, when policymakers are often willing to countenance international instability to achieve national interests. 112 At the same time, policymakers are far more sensitive to low-probability, high-consequence events such as a nuclear attack. 113 These factors led U.S. decisionmakers to embrace the inhibition mission and pay higher prices to achieve it.…”