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A major unexplored area in the field of international politics is the consequences of major war for members of the international system in terms of power lost or gained. This paper explores these shifts of power among neutrals, winners, and losers as a result of these wars, using a sample of 32 cases and time series analysis. The findings register unexpected but systematic patterns after major conflicts; while winners and neutrals are affected marginally by the conflict, losers' powers are at first eroded. Over the long run (15–20 years), though, the effects of the loss dissipate; losers accelerate their recovery and soon resume antebellum status. It is this phenomenon that the authors call the phoenix factor.

This study applies insights from the power parity and the democratic peace perspectives to the issue of internal political violence. These two international relations perspectives translate well to the domain of domestic politics. Relative parity of resources between the government and the opposition are shown to lead to higher levels of violence. Democratic countries with highly competitive and participatory institutions are able to mitigate violent conflict within their borders. Efficient governments preserve domestic peace regardless of institutional format. Results of the study suggest that violence is generated by similar changes in both domestic and world politics.

This paper presents a formal model that characterizes the two faces of development-persistent poverty, and industrialization and rising incomes-and establishes that the interaction between politics and economics determines which path a nation travels. We demonstrate that political factors affect fertility decisions so that a one-time disturbance compounds across generations, impacting a country's entire development trajectory. Modeling strategic multiobjective policy-setting by the government, we derive a new concept of political capacity and prove that a sufficient amount of political capacity is necessary to escape a poverty trap and develop the economy. Empirical tests for a sample of 100 countries from 1960 to 1990 provide strong support for the predictions of the formal model. In particular, we show that both political stability and political capacity significantly influence birth rates. We conclude that politics can be either a stimulant or a barrier to economic development.This paper presents a formal model that characterizes the two faces of development-a poverty trap with persistent economic stagnation, and industrialization and rising incomes-and establishes politics as a fundamental determinant of the trajectory taken by a nation. We demonstrate that policy choices at a single point affect a country's development path by impacting fertility decisions across generations. The primary policy implication of our analysis is that sustained economic development has political prerequisites.The model in this paper formalizes and extends a number of alternate approaches to demographic change and economic development. First, we capture insights from the modernization literature that show that rising incomes lead to lower fertility rates~Thompson, 1929;Notestein, 1945; with recent work by

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