The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind

Abstract

Abstract:Crazyism about X is the view that something that it would be crazy to believe must be among the core truths about X. In this essay, I argue that crazyism is true of the metaphysics of mind. A position is "crazy" in the intended sense if it is contrary to common sense and we are not epistemically compelled to believe it. Crazyism about the metaphysics of mind can thus be treated as the conjunction of two sub-theses: (1.) that something contrary to common sense must be among the core truths of the metaphysics of mind and (2.) that whatever that true thing is, we are not epistemically compelled to believe it. I defend the first thesis on grounds of the probable incoherence of folk metaphysics, from which follows that any fully fleshed-out metaphysics will inevitably conflict with some piece of that incoherent story. I defend the second thesis on three grounds: peer disagreement, lack of a compelling method for resolving metaphysical disputes about the mind, and the dubiousness of the general cosmological claims with which metaphysical claims about the mind are entangled. SchwitzgebelJuly 12, 2013Crazy Mind, p. 3 The Crazyist Metaphysics of MindMysterians about the mind -Colin McGinn (1989McGinn ( , 2004 commonsensical metaphysics ought to be attractive to at least a certain portion of philosophers.At least it ought to command attention as a foil. It oughtn't be so downmarket as to be entirely invisible.1 For example, Frege 1884/1953, 1918/1956 (though see Reck 2005; Lewis 1986; Yablo 1987. Schwitzgebel July 12, 2013Crazy Mind, p. 5Second possible explanation. Metaphysics is very difficult. A thoroughly commonsensical metaphysics is out there to be discovered; we simply haven't found it yet. If all goes well, someday someone will piece it all together, top to bottom, with no serious violence to common sense anywhere in the system. I fear this is wishful thinking against the evidence. In the next several sections I will discuss the case of the metaphysics of mind in particular.Third possible explanation. Common sense is incoherent in matters of metaphysics.Contradictions thus inevitably flow from it, and no coherent metaphysical system can respect it all. Although ordinary common sense serves us fairly well in practical maneuvers through the social and physical world, common sense has proven an unreliable guide in cosmology and probability theory and microphysics and neuroscience and macroeconomics and evolutionary biology and structural engineering and medicine and topology. If, as it seems to, metaphysics more closely resembles these latter endeavors than it resembles reaching practical judgments, we might excusably doubt the dependability of common sense as a guide to metaphysics. 2Undependability doesn't imply incoherence, of course. But it seems a natural next step in this case, and it would tidily explain the historical fact at hand.On the first explanation, we could easily enough invent a thoroughly commonsensical metaphysical system if we wanted one, but we don't want one. On the second explanation, ...

Kant Meets Cyberpunk

“…But this is where a commitment to flexibility about implementation seems to lead us. The bizarreness of this idea is one reason to have some qualms about the assumptions and argumentative moves that brought us to it; but as I have argued elsewhere, all general theories of the conscious mind have some highly bizarre consequences, so bizarreness is not necessarily a defeater (Schwitzgebel 2014).…”

“…We successfully navigate among those objects, and there are many empirical facts that correlate with their perceived spatial structure-how long it takes to walk somewhere, how much the magnet pulls one nail rather than another, where the stone we throw will be perceived to land. Whatever struc- 12 On cosmological skepticism, see Schwitzgebel 2014Schwitzgebel , 2017a. Quote inspired by Hume 1779Hume /1947 For versions of this fourth consideration in support of transcendental idealism, see Putnam 1981, Langton 1998.…”

A Defense of the Rights of Artificial Intelligences

“…First, if society continues on the path toward developing more sophisticated artificial intelligence, 19. For more detail on the first author's generally skeptical views about the epistemology of consciousness, see Schwitzgebel 2011Schwitzgebel , 2014Schwitzgebel , 2015a developing a good theory of consciousness is a moral imperative. Second if we do reach the point where we can create entities whose moral status is reasonably disputable, we should consider an Excluded Middle Policy-that is, a policy of only creating AIs whose moral status is clear, one way or the other.…”

“…For more detail on the first author's generally skeptical views about the epistemology of consciousness, see Schwitzgebel , , .…”

Lost at Sea: A New Route to Metaphysical Skepticism

“…For a suspicion of what would come to be known as the synthetic a priori , see Hume (, §12.3); for a discussion of the inevitable conflict between common sense and any fleshed‐out metaphysical theory (with a focus on the metaphysics of mind), see Schwitzgebel (); for a discussion of the relentless persistence of metaphysical disagreement (especially among experts), see, inter alia , Van Inwagen (), Frances (), Van Inwagen (), Kornblith (), and Nolan (). (On the relationship between such an ‘argument from disagreement’ and my argument, see note 6.)…”