Lost at Sea: A New Route to Metaphysical Skepticism

Abstract

Global metaphysical skepticism is the view that we have no knowledge of any substantive metaphysical thesis. Various reasons have been provided in support of global metaphysical skepticism. I provide a new one. The reason, very roughly, is this. Metaphysical theses come together as packages. Such packages are very different from each other. Because the packages are so different, we cannot know of any one of the packages that it isn't true. And because we cannot know of any one of them that it isn't true, we cannot know any substantive metaphysical thesis at all. My paper makes this argument much more precise and defends each of the premises in detail.

Systematicity and Skepticism

“… See, inter alia, Nolan [2007], Adams[2009],MacBride [2014],Heil [2017, p. 104],Williams [2017, p. 164],Koons and Pickavance [2017],Beebee [2018, p.17],McDaniel [2020], andSegal [2020].…”

“…InSegal [2020] I cash out systematicity in terms of the "space of grand (metaphysical) theories" and the viable regions in that space-and argue that systematicity so understood leads to skepticism. The way I cash out systematicity here is very different, as is the route I take from systematicity to skepticism.…”