Kant Meets Cyberpunk

Schwitzgebel, Eric

doi:10.2478/disp-2019-0006

Cited by 10 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…Arguably, epistemically inhospitable plans are pre-18. Scenarios like many in this list are discussed (amongst other places) in Schwitzgebel (2019).…”

Section: From Laxity Of Standards To Skepticismmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Skeptical Challenge of the Theistic Multiverse

Pittard

2023

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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The multiverse theodicy says that because God can without cost create an infinite number of universes, the standards of acceptability that a conceivable universe must meet to be worthy of divine creation are significantly laxer than is typically supposed in discussions of the problem of evil. While the prospect of a theistic multiverse arguably helps the theist to explain suffering, I argue that it also poses a serious skeptical worry. Given the alleged laxity of the standards that a universe must meet to be worthy of inclusion in a theistic multiverse, there is reason to think that God would be justified in creating a great many deceptive universes that, while good overall, are inhabited by creatures who are radically mistaken in their beliefs. And these deceptive universes would arguably be no less abundant than the nondeceptive universes. After developing this skeptical challenge, I assess some possible theistic responses. One of the more promising responses I consider argues that in order to secure the great good of true friendship between God and creatures, God has reason to exclude deceptive universes from the multiverse even when those universes have great intrinsic value.

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“…Arguably, epistemically inhospitable plans are pre-18. Scenarios like many in this list are discussed (amongst other places) in Schwitzgebel (2019).…”

Section: From Laxity Of Standards To Skepticismmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Skeptical Challenge of the Theistic Multiverse

Pittard

2023

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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“…For more on the relational individuation of fundamental properties, see Yates (2018). 39 Schwitzgebel (2019) argues for a Kantian phenomenological conception of Matrix spacetime based on simple phenomenal role functionalism about spacetime.…”

Section: Role Spacetime Functionalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Thinking about Spacetime

Yates¹

2021

Philosophy Beyond Spacetime

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Several different quantum gravity research programmes suggest, for various reasons, that spacetime is not part of the fundamental ontology of physics. This gives rise to the problem of empirical coherence, which I frame in terms of entailment: how could a non-spatiotemporal fundamental theory entail spatiotemporal evidence propositions? Solutions to this puzzle can be classified as realist or antirealist, depending on whether or not they posit a non-fundamental spacetime structure grounded in or caused by the fundamental structure. These approaches place different constraints on our everyday concepts of space and time. Applying lessons from the philosophy of mind, I argue that only realism is both conceptually plausible and suitable for addressing the problem at hand. I suggest a role-functionalist version of realism, which is consistent with both grounding and causation, and according to which our everyday concepts reveal something of the true nature of emergent spacetime.

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“…If our rejection of naïve objectivism is limited to color and other traditional secondary qualities, we can at least retain a sense of real contact with “things as they are in themselves” through our sensory access to their spatial properties. But if we take the next step and give up naïve objectivism about spatial properties, we seem to lose all contact with things in themselves (Schwitzgebel, 2019). Our experience becomes less like a window on the world (or even a color‐tinted window on the world), more like a virtual‐reality headset 17.…”

Section: Responses To the Paradoxmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Many functionalists seem to tacitly assume that the inputs and outputs will be specified at a very high level of abstraction. For example, many functionalists hold that a detailed computer simulation of our bodies and environments would suffice to duplicate our phenomenology (Bostrom, 2003; Schwitzgebel, 2019). But the “inputs” and “outputs” in such a computer simulation would be computational processes that could well be entirely insensitive to physical left/right orientation (e.g., operations on 1's and 0's on a vertical tape).…”

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confidence: 99%

A puzzle about the experience of left and right

Cutter

2020

Nous

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Imagine your mirror-inverted counterpart on Mirror Earth, a perfect mirror image of Earth. Would her experiences be the same as yours, or would they be phenomenally mirror-inverted? I argue, first, that her experiences would be phenomenally the same as yours. I then show that this conclusion gives rise to a puzzle, one that I believe pushes us toward some surprising and philosophically significant conclusions about the nature of perception. When you have a typical visual experience as of something to your left, the following three claims seem very plausible: (1) No one could have an experience phenomenally just like yours without thereby having an experience as of something to her left. (2) Your experience is veridical. (3) Your experience doesn't differ from that of your mirror-inverted counterpart with respect to veridicality. But (1)-(3) jointly contradict the claim that you and your mirror-inverted counterpart would have the same experiences. I argue that any viable response to this puzzle will embrace the following disjunction: either there is a degree of independence between perceptual phenomenology and representational content, contrary to popular intentionalist views of perception, or spatial subjectivism is true, where spatial subjectivism is the view that the spatial properties presented in perception are either minddependent or illusory.

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Kant Meets Cyberpunk

Cited by 10 publications

References 29 publications

The Skeptical Challenge of the Theistic Multiverse

The Skeptical Challenge of the Theistic Multiverse

Thinking about Spacetime

A puzzle about the experience of left and right

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