A Defense of the Rights of Artificial Intelligences

Schwitzgebel, Eric; Garza, Mara

doi:10.1111/misp.12032

Cited by 79 publications

(47 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…The argument has some similarities with the 'no-relevant-difference' argument presented bySchwitzgebel and Garza (2015). But their argument is not grounded in the behaviourist view and is open to multiple possible understandings of a 'relevant difference'.…”

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confidence: 83%

“…Members of this audience will note that several authors have already defended the claim that we should take the moral status of robots seriously (e.g. Gunkel 2018aGunkel & 2018bCoeckelbergh 2012;Sparrow 2004Sparrow & 2012Levy 2009;Neely 2014;Schwitzgebel and Garza 2015). The debt to these authors is fully acknowledged.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…Schwitzgebel and Garza (2015) have an extended discussion of AI-fragility (or the lack thereof) and what it might mean for moral status. They initially agree with the position adopted in this article but also suggest that certain aspects of machine ontology might warrant greater moral protection.18 Contrariwise, if replaceability undermines the need for certain kinds of moral protections, then perhaps we need a new set of moral norms for entities that are easily replaceable.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Welcoming Robots into the Moral Circle: A Defence of Ethical Behaviourism

Danaher

2019

Sci Eng Ethics

143

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Can robots have significant moral status? This is an emerging topic of debate among roboticists and ethicists. This paper makes three contributions to this debate. First, it presents a theory-'ethical behaviourism'-which holds that robots can have significant moral status if they are roughly performatively equivalent to other entities that have significant moral status. This theory is then defended from seven objections. Second, taking this theoretical position onboard, it is argued that the performative threshold that robots need to cross in order to be afforded significant moral status may not be that high and that they may soon cross it (if they haven't done so already). Finally, the implications of this for our procreative duties to robots are considered, and it is argued that we may need to take seriously a duty of 'procreative beneficence' towards robots.

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confidence: 83%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 96%

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confidence: 99%

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Welcoming Robots into the Moral Circle: A Defence of Ethical Behaviourism

Danaher

2019

Sci Eng Ethics

143

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“…The doctrine was eventually 16. For some recent discussions, Schwitzgebel and Garza (2015); Gunkel (2018); Bryson, Diamantis, and Grant, (2017);and Turner (2018).…”

Section: Rights and Responsibilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

First Steps Towards an Ethics of Robots and Artificial Intelligence

Tasioulas

2018

SSRN Journal

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This article offers an overview of the main first-order ethical questions raised by robots and Artificial Intelligence (RAIs) under five broad rubrics: functionality, inherent significance, rights and responsibilities, side-effects, and threats. The first letter of each rubric taken together conveniently generates the acronym FIRST.Special attention is given to the rubrics of functionality and inherent significance given the centrality of the former and the tendency to neglect the latter in virtue of its somewhat nebulous and contested character. In addition to exploring some illustrative issues arising under each rubric, the article also emphasizes a number of more general themes. These include: the multiplicity of interacting levels on which ethical questions about RAIs arise, the need to recognise that RAIs potentially implicate the full gamut of human values (rather than exclusively or primarily some readily identifiable sub-set of ethical or legal principles), and the need for practically salient ethical reflection on RAIs to be informed by a realistic appreciation of their existing and foreseeable capacities.

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“…If we program AS with emotions and empathy to build trust, will they suffer if we treat them badly? If AS are moral agents that can suffer, then building trustworthy autonomous systems also means building an ethical and legal framework around their use and identifying their rights [81]. Japanese roboticists are already designing robots to have 'kokoro', translated into heart, spirit or mind [1].…”

Section: What or Who Should We Trust?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Trustworthiness of Autonomous Systems

Devitt

2018

Foundations of Trusted Autonomy

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A Defense of the Rights of Artificial Intelligences

Cited by 79 publications

References 36 publications

Welcoming Robots into the Moral Circle: A Defence of Ethical Behaviourism

Welcoming Robots into the Moral Circle: A Defence of Ethical Behaviourism

First Steps Towards an Ethics of Robots and Artificial Intelligence

Trustworthiness of Autonomous Systems

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