Tenacious hardware trojans due to high temperature in middle tiers of 3-D ICs

Hasan, Syed Rafay; Mossa, Siraj Fulum; Elkeelany, Omar; Awwad, Falah

doi:10.1109/mwscas.2015.7282148

Cited by 23 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…New three-dimensional (3D) IC technology will change the current IC supply chain model and may produce new vulnerabilities. For instance, Hasan et al proposed a novel HT that utilized the unique structure of 3D ICs [116]. Such a Trojan circuit can only be triggered by the thermal effect of middle tiers in 3D ICs.…”

Section: ) Newly Emerging Threatsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Survey on Machine Learning Against Hardware Trojan Attacks: Recent Advances and Challenges

et al. 2020

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The remarkable success of machine learning (ML) in a variety of research domains has inspired academic and industrial communities to explore its potential to address hardware Trojan (HT) attacks. While numerous works have been published over the past decade, few survey papers, to the best of our knowledge, have systematically reviewed the achievements and analyzed the remaining challenges in this area. To fill this gap, this article surveys ML-based approaches against HT attacks available in the literature. In particular, we first provide a classification of all possible HT attacks and then review recent developments from four perspectives, i.e., HT detection, design-for-security (DFS), bus security, and secure architecture. Based on the review, we further discuss the lessons learned in and challenges arising from previous studies. Despite current work focusing more on chip-layer HT problems, it is notable that novel HT threats are constantly emerging and have evolved beyond chips and to the component, device, and even behavior layers, therein compromising the security and trustworthiness of the overall hardware ecosystem. Therefore, we divide the HT threats into four layers and propose a hardware Trojan defense (HTD) reference model from the perspective of the overall hardware ecosystem, therein categorizing the security threats and requirements in each layer to provide a guideline for future research in this direction.

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Section: ) Newly Emerging Threatsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Survey on Machine Learning Against Hardware Trojan Attacks: Recent Advances and Challenges

et al. 2020

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“…However, to avoid failures, the clock period can be managed to counter the system glitches. The authors in [43] have, nevertheless, suggested that despite clock management, the period of momentary glitches tends to increase with NBTI and may set off pre-determined activity related to malicious circuitry.…”

Section: A Design Considerationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ingress of Threshold Voltage-Triggered Hardware Trojan in the Modern FPGA Fabric–Detection Methodology and Mitigation

et al. 2020

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The ageing phenomenon of negative bias temperature instability (NBTI) continues to challenge the dynamic thermal management of modern FPGAs. Increased transistor density leads to thermal accumulation and propagates higher and non-uniform temperature variations across the FPGA. This aggravates the impact of NBTI on key PMOS transistor parameters such as threshold voltage and drain current. Where it ages the transistors, with a successive reduction in FPGA lifetime and reliability, it also challenges its security. The ingress of threshold voltage-triggered hardware Trojan, a stealthy and malicious electronic circuit, in the modern FPGA, is one such potential threat that could exploit NBTI and severely affect its performance. The development of an effective and efficient countermeasure against it is, therefore, highly critical. Accordingly, we present a comprehensive FPGA security scheme, comprising novel elements of hardware Trojan infection, detection, and mitigation, to protect FPGA applications against the hardware Trojan. Built around the threat model of a naval warship's integrated self-protection system (ISPS), we propose a threshold voltage-triggered hardware Trojan that operates in a threshold voltage region of 0.45V to 0.998V, consuming ultra-low power (10.5nW), and remaining stealthy with an area overhead as low as 1.5% for a 28 nm technology node. The hardware Trojan detection sub-scheme provides a unique lightweight threshold voltage-aware sensor with a detection sensitivity of 0.251mV/nA. With fixed and dynamic ring oscillatorbased sensor segments, the precise measurement of frequency and delay variations in response to shifts in the threshold voltage of a PMOS transistor is also proposed. Finally, the FPGA security scheme is reinforced with an online transistor dynamic scaling (OTDS) to mitigate the impact of hardware Trojan through run-time tolerant circuitry capable of identifying critical gates with worst-case drain current degradation. INDEX TERMS Ageing mechanism, field programmable gate array (FPGA), hardware Trojan, negative bias temperature instability (NBTI), propagation delay, reliability, threshold voltage. I. INTRODUCTION A modern FPGA is not merely an emulator but a hardware accelerator with heterogenous hard IP cores, such as complex memory blocks, multiple processors, and DSP blocks. Systems on chip (SoC), network on chip (NoC), and adaptive compute acceleration platform (ACAP) are the significant performance and functional enhancements of FPGAs, that have been made possible due to the continual shrinking of transistor sizes down to the scales of 10 nm and below. The performance benefits, however, are limited by power The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Luis Javier Garcia Villalba. and timing closures. Similarly, the geometric structures of FPGAs with much less silicon and relatively more oxide and moulding compound complicate the heat conduction paths [1]. On the one hand, where it may deteriorate the worstcase heat dissi...

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“…As indicated, this is especially attractive for 3D chips where such monitors can be implemented in trustworthy dies, separated from the potentially Trojaninfected legacy chips [127], [129], [130], [139]. Nevertheless, some Trojans may be crafted specifically for 3D integration and end up being "buried somewhere in the midst of the 3D chip"; they are harder to detect during runtime [134], and may also exploit distinct trigger mechanisms such as increased internal heating [154].…”

Section: Detection Of Hardware Trojansmentioning

confidence: 99%

Large-Scale 3D Chips: Challenges and Solutions for Design Automation, Testing, and Trustworthy Integration

Knechtel

Sinanoglu

Elfadel

et al. 2017

IPSJ Transactions on System LSI Design Methodology

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Three-dimensional (3D) integration of electronic chips has been advocated by both industry and academia for many years. It is acknowledged as one of the most promising approaches to meet ever-increasing demands on performance, functionality, and power consumption. Furthermore, 3D integration has been shown to be most effective and efficient once large-scale integration is targeted for. However, a multitude of challenges has thus far obstructed the mainstream transition from "classical 2D chips" to such large-scale 3D chips. In this paper, we survey all popular 3D integration options available and advocate that using an interposer as system-level integration backbone would be the most practical for large-scale industrial applications and design reuse. We review major design (automation) challenges and related promising solutions for interposer-based 3D chips in particular, among the other 3D options. Thereby we outline (i) the need for a unified workflow, especially once full-custom design is considered, (ii) the current design-automation solutions and future prospects for both classical (digital) and advanced (heterogeneous) interposer stacks, (iii) the state-of-art and open challenges for testing of 3D chips, and (iv) the challenges of securing hardware in general and the prospects for large-scale and trustworthy 3D chips in particular.

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Tenacious hardware trojans due to high temperature in middle tiers of 3-D ICs

Cited by 23 publications

References 6 publications

A Survey on Machine Learning Against Hardware Trojan Attacks: Recent Advances and Challenges

A Survey on Machine Learning Against Hardware Trojan Attacks: Recent Advances and Challenges

Ingress of Threshold Voltage-Triggered Hardware Trojan in the Modern FPGA Fabric–Detection Methodology and Mitigation

Large-Scale 3D Chips: Challenges and Solutions for Design Automation, Testing, and Trustworthy Integration

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