Taxation and the Environment: A Survey

Smith, Stephen

doi:10.1111/j.1475-5890.1992.tb00505.x

Cited by 56 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 56 publications

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“…Moreover, this burden is mainly born by carbon-intensive industries, which are usually exposed sectors. Although these payments could be recycled through lower other taxes such as lower taxes on labor (Smith 1992), the carbonbased, energy-intensive and exposed industries especially will not be compensated entirely by such revenue recycling efforts. 8 Indeed, our calculations show that such payments related to pure taxes or full-blown auctioned TDP systems will be a multiple of the abatement costs.…”

Section: Political Acceptability Of Pure Taxes and Auctioned Tdpsmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Their focus is on prevention or at least alleviation of individual welfare losses which might be caused by tax reform measures, despite the existence of welfare gains on the aggregate, social level. 13 The provisions proposed in the EU carbon/energy tax are also of this type (see Smith andVollebergh 1993 andKoutstaal et al 1995). 14 As far as we know this principle has been put forward in carbon policy for the first time in the debate about a Dutch energy/carbon tax (see SER 1993).…”

Section: Comparing Carbon Incentive Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 98%

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Hybrid carbon incentive mechanisms and political acceptability

Vollebergh

Vries²,

Koutstaal

1997

Environ Resource Econ

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This paper analyses how hybrid systems of carbon taxes and tradeable permits optimize some conflicting dimensions of political acceptability related to the design of these instruments. Pure systems like taxes without exemptions or auctioned tradeable permits cause problems for political acceptability in open economies due to high overall costs (abatement cost plus payments on the tax or auctions) for current polluters. Unfortunately, pure systems based on grandfathering of emission rights across the board do not provide a feasible alternative because of monitoring and enforcement problems. In contrast, consciously designed hybrid systems employ grandfathering of emission rights together with either carbon taxes or auctioned carbon permits in order to overcome acceptability problems of pure systems, while leaving incentives to reduce emissions at the margin untouched. Moreover, monitoring and enforcement costs of the hybrid systems are less due to the lower number of participating agents compared with the pure systems, while opportunities for costor burden-sharing exist as well. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997carbon pollution credits, carbon taxes, environmental policy, externalities, hybrid instruments, tradeable carbon permits,

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Section: Political Acceptability Of Pure Taxes and Auctioned Tdpsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Comparing Carbon Incentive Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Hybrid carbon incentive mechanisms and political acceptability

Vollebergh

Vries²,

Koutstaal

1997

Environ Resource Econ

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“…From the economic point of view, the objective of CTs is to ensure that all the external costs associated with climate change are fully taken into account (Pigou, 1920). In practice, this raises some difficulties concerning the estimation of the accurate external cost of climate change (McKay et al, 1990;Smith 1992). Therefore, the primary purpose of CTs is to provide incentives for polluters to emit less carbon rather than fully internalize the external cost associated with climate change.…”

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confidence: 99%

Public preferences for carbon tax attributes

Gevrek

Uyduranoglu

2015

Ecological Economics

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The impacts of climate change are already visible throughout the world. Recognizing the threats posed by climate change, the Durban Platform, the 17th Session of the Conference of Parties (COP 17), underscores that the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation and ambitious action by all countries. A crucial starting point for the design of effective and publicly acceptable policies is to explore public preferences for climate policy instruments. Using a choice experiment, this study investigates public preferences for carbon tax attributes in a developing country context. The results account for heterogeneity in preferences and show that Turkish people prefer a carbon tax with a progressive cost distribution rather than one with a regressive cost distribution. The private cost has a negative effect on the probability of choosing the tax. Earmarking carbon tax revenues increases the public acceptability of the tax. Moreover, there is a preference for a carbon tax that promotes public awareness of climate change.

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“…En ce qui concerne ce troisième type de second dividende, Pearson et Smith [1991], Smith [1992] Ballard et al [1985] ou Nordhaus [1991]). En l absence d études comparables pour l Europe ou la France, on peut remarquer avec Ekins [1997] que les distorsions fiscales y sont au moins aussi importantes qu aux USA, dans la mesure où le poids des prélèvements obligatoires est dans la Communauté européenne supérieur de 50% à celui des États-Unis ou du Japon, et qu il n y a aucune raison de penser que le système fiscal européen soit plus efficace que le système fiscal américain.…”

Section: De L Importance De La Définition Du Double Dividendeunclassified

Le double dividende. Les approches théoriques

Chiroleu‐Assouline¹

2001

rfeco

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La notion de double dividende se réfère au cas où l instauration d une taxe environnementale, à recettes budgétaires inchangées pour l État, fait apparaître à la fois un bénéfice environnemental et un bénéfice de nature économique. Les premières études théoriques, en équilibre général, réfutaient cette hypothèse de double dividende et montraient qu au contraire, les taxes environnementales exacerbent, plutôt qu elles n allègent, les distorsions fiscales préexistantes. Cependant, le rôle essentiel joué dans ces résultats par l élasticité non compensée de l offre de travail au pouvoir d achat du salaire met l accent sur les hypothèses fondamentales de ces études, à savoir la concurrence pure et parfaite et l équilibre sur le marché du travail. Les imperfections de concurrence ainsi que l existence de chômage involontaire rendent plus probable l occurrence d un double dividende au sens fort, de même que la prise en compte du rôle de la qualité de l environnement dans les comportements des ménages ou dans la structure productive. ABSTRACT : The double dividend Theoretical approachesOne speaks about double dividend when the revenue neutral substitution of environmental taxes for other taxes leads to both an environmental benefit and an economic one. The first theoretical studies of this question, in a general equilibrium framework, assess that there is no secondary benefit in the sense of a reduction in tax distorsions. However, there are cases in which positive welfare gains obtain : when the environmental tax reform involves a tax shifting from labor to other factors or when there are feedbacks effects from environmental quality to the economic system. When studying this issue under the assumptions of imperfect competition and non clearing labour market, the occurrence of a double dividend becomes more likely.

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Taxation and the Environment: A Survey

Cited by 56 publications

References 56 publications

Hybrid carbon incentive mechanisms and political acceptability

Hybrid carbon incentive mechanisms and political acceptability

Public preferences for carbon tax attributes

Le double dividende. Les approches théoriques

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