System dynamics model for high‐speed railway operation safety supervision system based on evolutionary game theory

Li, Kehong; Zhang, Yadong; Guo, Jun; Ge, Xiaocheng; Yue-bin, SU

doi:10.1002/cpe.4743

Cited by 15 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…As shown in Figure 8 , Figure 9 and Figure 10 , under the static penalty control strategy, the players’ strategy selection fluctuates periodically. This finding is consistent with previous studies [ 11 , 57 ] and shows that in the safety supervision process, when considering different interest demands among multiple participants, the strategy selection of participants will fluctuate and ESS does not occur in the game process. This result reflects problems associated with the current static supervision mode of China.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 93%

“…System dynamics is a quantitative simulation method to analyze information feedback mechanism, which is often used to study complex systems [ 11 , 57 ]. In previous studies, given the complex nonlinear relationship among multiplayer evolutionary game players, SD has been applied to simulate the stability of the equilibrium solution of multiplayer evolutionary games, such as resource allocation [ 58 ], public-private partnership projects [ 59 ], environmental regulation [ 60 ], and safety regulation [ 11 ].…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Developing a Dynamic Supervision Mechanism to Improve Construction Safety Investment Supervision Efficiency in China: Theoretical Simulation of Evolutionary Game Process

Gong

Gao

Zhou

et al. 2021

IJERPH

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The construction industry suffers from poor safety performance caused by the joint effect of insufficient safety investment by contractors and inefficient safety supervision by the government because of the information gap between the two sides. The present study aims to put forward a new pathway to improve safety investment supervision efficiency and analyze the decision-making interactions of stakeholders under this new pathway. For this purpose, this study establishes a safety investment information system to eliminate the information gap between the government and contractors for construction projects in China and further develops a dynamic safety investment supervision mechanism based on this. Evolutionary game theory is used to describe the decision-making interactions among stakeholders under the current static supervision mechanism and the dynamic supervision mechanism proposed in this research. Moreover, system dynamics is adopted to simulate the evolutionary game process and analyze the supervision effect and equilibrium state of different supervision mechanisms. The results reveal that the proposed safety investment information system could facilitate the transition of the supervision mode from static to dynamic; the evolutionarily stable strategy does not exist in the current static penalty scenario; and the dynamic supervision mechanism that correlates penalties with contractors’ unlawful behavior probability can restrain the fluctuation of the evolutionary game model effectively and the players’ strategy choices gradually stabilize in the equilibrium state. The results validate the effectiveness of the proposed dynamic supervision mechanism in improving supervision efficiency. This study not only contributes to the literature on safety supervision policy-making but also helps to improve supervision efficiency in practice.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 93%

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Developing a Dynamic Supervision Mechanism to Improve Construction Safety Investment Supervision Efficiency in China: Theoretical Simulation of Evolutionary Game Process

Gong

Gao

Zhou

et al. 2021

IJERPH

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show abstract

“…Then, the stability of all equilibrium solutions can be analyzed through theoretical derivation and SD simulation. According to the investigations by related experts in the HSR industry [41], the specific parameters are obtained as shown in Table 3 after pretreatment.…”

Section: Replicator Dynamics Of a Multiple Agent Supervision Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, to date, those researchers have focused on qualitative analysis without in-depth theoretical research [38,39], or they only used traditional game theory to analyze the game between two stakeholders [40]. Li et al [41] established a static evolutionary game model that is composed of HSR company, the State Railway Administration (SRA) and the commissioned Railways Bureau (RB) on a macro level. They summarizes the differences between safety supervision/inspection of HSR company and safety supervision/management of SRA by analyzing the current status of HSR operational safety supervision system.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game Modelling and Strategy Research on the System Dynamics–Based Quadruplicate Evolution for High–Speed Railway Operational Safety Supervision System

Wang

Zhang

et al. 2019

Sustainability

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In view of the entrusted transportation management model (ETMM) of China’s high–speed railway (HSR), the supervision strategy of an HSR company for its multiple agents plays a very important role in ensuring the safety and sustainable development of HSR. Due to the existence of multiple agents in ETMM, the supervision strategy for these agents is usually difficult to formulate. In this study, a quadruplicate HSR safety supervision system evolutionary game model composed of an HSR company and three agents was established through the analysis of the complex game relationship existing in the system. The behavioral characteristics and the steady state of decision–making of all stakeholders involved in the system are proved by evolutionary game theory and system dynamics simulation. The results show that there will be long–term fluctuations in the strategies selected by the four stakeholders in the static reward–penalty control scenario (RPCS), which indicates that an evolutionary stable strategy does not exist. With increases in the reward–penalty coefficient, the fluctuations are intensified. Therefore, the dynamic RPCS was proposed to control the fluctuations, and the simulation was repeated. The results show that the fluctuations can be effectively restrained by adopting the dynamic RPCS, but if the coefficients are the same, the static RPCS is better than the dynamic RPCS for increasing the safety investment rate of the three agents. This demonstrates that the HSR company should apply these two control scenarios flexibly according to the actual situation when formulating a supervision strategy in order to effectively control and enhance the safety level of HSR operations when multiple agents are involved.

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“…But as systems become more complex, and especially when that complexity is attributed to the bounded rationality of humans (Simon, 1957), it becomes cumbersome for simulations to capture the sometimes unpredictable behaviour of the increasing number of (human or organisational) actors within systems. Of course, the field of simulation is not static and major advances in areas like agent-based modelling (ABM) (Macal & North, 2010;Secchi, 2015Secchi, , 2017 and Systems Dynamics (SD) (Akkermans & Van Oorschot, 2005;Li, Zhang, Guo, Ge, & Su, 2018;Morgan, Howick, & Belton, 2017) have taken place, modelling aspects of human or organisational activity that previously were not considered feasible. Nevertheless, these fields, and particularly ABM, are still evolving and have a long way to go until they can fully capture the richness of human activity (Bazghandi, 2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Improving the decision-making qualities of gaming simulations

Roungas

Bekius

Verbraeck

et al. 2020

Journal of Simulation

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Gaming simulations (games) for policy and decision making have been the neglected "sibling" of educational and training games. The latter have experienced a widespread usage by practitioners and researchers, while the former have had limited, yet slowly increasing, adoption by organisations. As a result, various issues developing and using these games remain unaddressed. This includes the design of games, their validation, the actual game sessions, and applying the resulting knowledge from games in organisations. In this paper, solutions for issues identified in these four areas of gaming simulations are proposed. Solutions vary from purely analytical to purely social, stressing the interdisciplinary approach required to tackle the issues associated with them. The result consists of several theoretical and practical contributions as well as philosophical considerations regarding games for policy and decision making.

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System dynamics model for high‐speed railway operation safety supervision system based on evolutionary game theory

Cited by 15 publications

References 9 publications

Developing a Dynamic Supervision Mechanism to Improve Construction Safety Investment Supervision Efficiency in China: Theoretical Simulation of Evolutionary Game Process

Developing a Dynamic Supervision Mechanism to Improve Construction Safety Investment Supervision Efficiency in China: Theoretical Simulation of Evolutionary Game Process

Game Modelling and Strategy Research on the System Dynamics–Based Quadruplicate Evolution for High–Speed Railway Operational Safety Supervision System

Improving the decision-making qualities of gaming simulations

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