Game Modelling and Strategy Research on the System Dynamics–Based Quadruplicate Evolution for High–Speed Railway Operational Safety Supervision System

Abstract

In view of the entrusted transportation management model (ETMM) of China’s high–speed railway (HSR), the supervision strategy of an HSR company for its multiple agents plays a very important role in ensuring the safety and sustainable development of HSR. Due to the existence of multiple agents in ETMM, the supervision strategy for these agents is usually difficult to formulate. In this study, a quadruplicate HSR safety supervision system evolutionary game model composed of an HSR company and three agents was established through the analysis of the complex game relationship existing in the system. The behavioral characteristics and the steady state of decision–making of all stakeholders involved in the system are proved by evolutionary game theory and system dynamics simulation. The results show that there will be long–term fluctuations in the strategies selected by the four stakeholders in the static reward–penalty control scenario (RPCS), which indicates that an evolutionary stable strategy does not exist. With increases in the reward–penalty coefficient, the fluctuations are intensified. Therefore, the dynamic RPCS was proposed to control the fluctuations, and the simulation was repeated. The results show that the fluctuations can be effectively restrained by adopting the dynamic RPCS, but if the coefficients are the same, the static RPCS is better than the dynamic RPCS for increasing the safety investment rate of the three agents. This demonstrates that the HSR company should apply these two control scenarios flexibly according to the actual situation when formulating a supervision strategy in order to effectively control and enhance the safety level of HSR operations when multiple agents are involved.

China's Railway Transportation Safety Regulation System Based on Evolutionary Game Theory and System Dynamics

“…However, to date, most of the studies have focused on qualitative analysis without conducting in‐depth theoretical research (Han, 2015) or they only used traditional game theory to analyze the game between two stakeholders (Ji, Chen, Feng, & Tang, 2015). In view of the principal–agent model, Li, Wang, Zhang, Zheng, and Guo (2019) studied the evolutionary game of a high‐speed railway safety supervision system composed of a high‐speed railway company and three agents. Currently, this principal–agent model is only applicable to a small number of high‐speed railway companies in China, and it is not applicable to most other railway enterprises.…”

“…The parameter settings are as follows: INITIAL TIME = 0; FINAL TIME = 3,650; TIME STEP = 1; and Time Units: Day, namely, each player only changes their strategy and acts once per day. According to the China Railway Yearbook 2017 (Han, 2017), the State Railway Administration Financial Statement 2017 (State Railway Administration, 2017), the Financial Audit Report of the Cr 2017 (Baker Tilly International Limited, 2017), the Production Safety Law of the People's Republic of China (Chinese People's Congress, 2014), the Regulations on Railway Safety Management (The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2013), and the investigations of railway industry experts (Li et al., 2019), the initial values of the external variables in this mode are shown in Table III after preprocessing.…”

“…The expected loss of the SRA when there is no‐regulation consists of two parts: the government performance loss and the reputation loss. The data of the two parts are calculated from China Railway Yearbook 2017 (Han, 2017) and the investigations of railway industry experts (Li et al., 2019). The public economic losses caused by railway transportation safety accidents are calculated from the China Railway Yearbook 2017 (Han, 2017).…”

Game Modelling and Strategy Research on Trilateral Evolution for Coal-Mine Operational Safety Production System: A Simulation Approach

“…Evolutionary game theory was developed to overcome the disadvantages of traditional game theory when analyzing the bounded rationality of players and the dynamic process of game playing [35][36][37][38][39]. In the process of coal-mine safety production in China, the players are bounded rational and they change their strategies dynamically by observing and comparing payoff with others and then adjust their strategies.…”

The Collective Strategies of Key Stakeholders in Sponge City Construction: A Tripartite Game Analysis of Governments, Developers, and Consumers

“…This method can also be used to capture dynamically the interactive behavior of strategy selections based on building information modeling (BIM) [34]. It is also combined with the system dynamics to carry out the game and simulation research on the evolution of the quadripartite safety supervision system for high-speed railway companies and their agents [35]. Evolutionary game theory in all walks of life the economy played an important role in social studies.…”