Game Modelling and Strategy Research on Trilateral Evolution for Coal-Mine Operational Safety Production System: A Simulation Approach

Abstract

In view of the particularity and high risk of coal mining industry, the decision-making behavior of multiple agents inside the coal-mine enterprise plays a very important role in ensuring the safety and sustainable development of coal mining industry. The existing literature studies on coal-mine safety production focus mainly on statically analyzing the game among the external entities such as the government, the enterprises themselves, and the employees inside the enterprise from a macro perspective,are short of research on revealing the dynamic interactions among the actors directly involved in the coal-mine accidents and also on proposals for effective interactions that will lead to improved safety outcomes. Therefore, this paper explores the use of evolutionary game theory to describe the interactions among the stakeholders in China’s coal-mine safety production system, which includes the organization, the first-line miners, and the first-line managers. Moreover, the paper also explores dynamic simulations of the evolutionary game model to analyze the stability of stakeholder interactions and to identify equilibrium solutions. The simulation results show that when certain conditions are met, the decision-making behavior of the organization, miners, and managers can evolve into the unique ideal steady state (1, 1, 1). In addition, the strategy portfolio with a relatively high initial proportion of three agents converges more quickly to an ideal state than a relatively low strategy portfolio. Moreover, the stable state and equilibrium values are not affected by the initial value changes. Finally, we find that the combination of positive incentive policies and strict penalties policies can make the evolutionary game system converge to desired stability faster. The application of the evolutionary game and numerical simulation when simulating the multiplayer game process of coal-mine safety production is an effective way, which provides a more effective solution to the safety and sustainable development of coal mining industry.

Influencing Factors, Formation Mechanism, and Pre-control Methods of Coal Miners′ Unsafe Behavior: A Systematic Literature Review

“…Meng et al ( 75 ) reviewed relevant articles on game theory and safety management during 2010–2019 and affirmed that the application of game theory in safety management research is conducive to determine the causes and motivations of unsafe behaviors. Li et al ( 79 ) also discussed the use of evolutionary game theory to describe the interaction between stakeholders in China's coal mine safety production system, including organizations, front-line miners, and front-line managers. They found that when certain conditions are met, the decision-making behaviors of organizations, miners, and managers can evolve into a unique ideal steady state.…”

Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Coal Mining Safe Production Supervision under the Chinese Central Government’s Reward and Punishment Mechanism

“…e effective supervision of coal miners' emotions is an important means to achieve coal mine safety [40]. When certain conditions are met, all parties in the game can reach the ideal stable state [41].…”

A study of asset portfolio risk control based on stochastic optimization

“…The frequent occurrence of recent financial crises and the gradual development of their impact from regional to global are constant reminders of the need to strengthen risk management [5]. The core of risk management is risk measurement, and there is no risk management if the risk of financial assets cannot be accurately measured.…”