Supply chain green innovation subsidy strategy considering consumer heterogeneity

Meng, Qingchun; Wang, Yingtong; Zhang, Zheng; He, Yang

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.125199

Cited by 62 publications

(43 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…Governments often incentivize green technology investment with subsidies. Meng et al [38] compared three types of green technology investment subsidy strategies. They found the government tends to subsidize the core manufacturer instead of subsidizing both the manufacturer and upstream supplier.…”

Section: Non-cooperative Supply-chain Operationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Green Technology Investment in a Decentralized Supply Chain under Demand Uncertainty

Zou

Geng

2021

Sustainability

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Green technology investment is an important factor that influences the sustainability and performance of the supply chain. In this paper, we use the game-theoretic approach, which is quite suitable to operation decision research, to model a supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer and discuss who should invest in green technology in a decentralized supply chain under demand uncertainty. An important result we found is that the retailer has a stronger investment motivation and higher investment efficiency compared to the supplier. The retailer also tends to invest in green technology himself when customers are not so sensitive to the product’s retail price. We analyze the supply chain sustainability, and find that high levels of green technology investments are not always necessarily good for environmental sustainability, it depends on the environmental impact’s sensitivity to green technology. Lastly, a joint investment mechanism is designed to induce the retailer to join in the green technology investment when he has no investment intention, and that realizes a Pareto improvement of the supply chain. Based on the results, we recommend designing more incentive mechanisms to induce the retailers to join in the green technology investment according to supply chain conditions.

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Section: Non-cooperative Supply-chain Operationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Green technology investment is also known as green innovation investment, sustainable technology investment, or environmental innovation investment [38]. Green technology investments have a positive effect on supply-chain sustainability, as recognized by many scholars [5,6,11,12].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Green Technology Investment in a Decentralized Supply Chain under Demand Uncertainty

Zou

Geng

2021

Sustainability

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“…Huang et al [10] built a multi-stage game model to investigate government subsidy choices and GSC members' pricing decisions in a capital-constrained GSC. Moreover, Yang et al [1] and Meng et al [31] explored the choice of subsidy strategy used in GSC management. However, they did not consider how the government's subsidy policy would affect the supplier's information leakage decisions.…”

Section: Government Subsidies In a Gscmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Green Operation and Information Leakage Decisions under Government Subsidy and Supply Uncertainty

Shang

2021

Sustainability

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This study investigated optimal green operation and information leakage decisions in a green supply chain system. The system consists of one supplier, one leader retailer 1, one follower retailer 2, and the government. In this system, the government subsidizes each retailer based on the selling price of the product. The supplier is subject to a yield uncertainty process. The suppler decides whether to leak leader retailer 1′s order quantity to follower retailer 2 or not. In this study, we first built a Stackelberg game to address the equilibrium green operation decisions, when the supplier has and has not information leakage behavior, respectively. Subsequently, we identify the supplier’s information leakage equilibrium and how such behavior affects retailers’ ex ante profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare through a numerical study. Interestingly, we obtained the following results: (1) Supplier leaks are the unique equilibrium of the supplier. The product’s green degree and wholesale price at supplier’s equilibrium are higher under information leakage than under no information leakage. (2) The supplier’s information leakage behavior is good for leader retailer 1 and bad for follower retailer 2. (3) Information leakage behavior increases both consumer surplus and social welfare under certain conditions. (4) In general, key system parameters (e.g., the subsidy rate, supply uncertainty, supply correlation, and forecast accuracies) positively correlate with consumer surplus and social welfare in the same direction, while they affect retailer 1′s and retailer 2′s ex ante profit in the opposite direction. These findings provide useful insights for businesses to manage demand forecast information and make decisions on the green level of the product in green supply chain management.

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“…On this basis, many scholars have included market-driven effect into the analytical framework. For example, Zhang and Yousaf [22] and Meng et al [23] analyzed the optimal innovation decisions in a supply chain by taking the comprehensive influence of government intervention and consumers' green preference into account. However, the above research studies on green innovation cooperation in a supply chain mainly focused on the analysis of static equilibrium strategies.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Differential Game Analysis of the Green Innovation Cooperation in Supply Chain under the Background of Dual-Driving

Zhu

Zhang

et al. 2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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Taking government environmental regulation and consumer’s green preference into a unified analytical framework, this study constructed a differential game model. With the joint effect of supplier and manufacturer green innovation efforts on the dynamic change of the product’s green level, it compared and analyzed the long-term dynamic equilibrium strategies of green innovation cooperation in a supply chain under decentralized and centralized decision-making situations. Accordingly, a scientific and reasonable profit-distribution contract was then proposed. On this basis, it further carried out a numerical simulation analysis on the dual-driving effects of the government and market. The results showed that the scientific and reasonable profit-distribution contract under the centralized decision-making situation, which was designed by using the Rubinstein bargaining game model, could effectively ensure that the supply chain members’ sharing profits would realize "Dual Pareto Improvements." With the increase of the environmental regulation’s intensity, the product’s green level kept rising and tended to be stable. However, the overall equilibrium profit of the supply chain was characterized by "U" fluctuation, which first descended and then ascended. In addition, the product’s green level, the green innovation investment and equilibrium (distributed) profits of supply chain members, and the overall profits of supply chain all increased with the consumers’ green preference.

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Supply chain green innovation subsidy strategy considering consumer heterogeneity

Cited by 62 publications

References 38 publications

Green Technology Investment in a Decentralized Supply Chain under Demand Uncertainty

Green Technology Investment in a Decentralized Supply Chain under Demand Uncertainty

Optimal Green Operation and Information Leakage Decisions under Government Subsidy and Supply Uncertainty

Differential Game Analysis of the Green Innovation Cooperation in Supply Chain under the Background of Dual-Driving

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