Differential Game Analysis of the Green Innovation Cooperation in Supply Chain under the Background of Dual-Driving

Abstract

Taking government environmental regulation and consumer’s green preference into a unified analytical framework, this study constructed a differential game model. With the joint effect of supplier and manufacturer green innovation efforts on the dynamic change of the product’s green level, it compared and analyzed the long-term dynamic equilibrium strategies of green innovation cooperation in a supply chain under decentralized and centralized decision-making situations. Accordingly, a scientific and reasonable profit-distribution contract was then proposed. On this basis, it further carried out a numerical simulation analysis on the dual-driving effects of the government and market. The results showed that the scientific and reasonable profit-distribution contract under the centralized decision-making situation, which was designed by using the Rubinstein bargaining game model, could effectively ensure that the supply chain members’ sharing profits would realize "Dual Pareto Improvements." With the increase of the environmental regulation’s intensity, the product’s green level kept rising and tended to be stable. However, the overall equilibrium profit of the supply chain was characterized by "U" fluctuation, which first descended and then ascended. In addition, the product’s green level, the green innovation investment and equilibrium (distributed) profits of supply chain members, and the overall profits of supply chain all increased with the consumers’ green preference.

Dynamic Incentive Mechanisms for Collaborative Innovation of Green Supply Chain Considering Digital Capability and Consumer Green Preference

“…This is in contrast to traditional innovation, which focuses only on financial gains [4]. Because of their higher eco-efficiency and enhanced environmental reputation, businesses that adopt green innovation frequently have a competitive edge over their rivals [5].…”

“…Nevertheless, the high expenses, risks, and "double externalities" associated with green innovation significantly diminish firms' incentives to pursue it [6]. Research indicates that vertical cooperation and synergy between supply chain members are necessary for the highest performance of green innovation [5], as firms' efforts alone do not yield the best results [7]. According to Chen et al [8], cooperative green research and development (R&D) can benefit companies, society, and the environment while also reducing or eliminating the negative environmental effects of goods or services.…”

“…The optimal decision making and incentive contracts of the GSC are analyzed dynamically rather than statically. Green innovation, pollutant emissions, and energy efficiency are all dynamic phenomena [5,26,27]. The product's greenness and the pertinent decisions made in the subsequent stage will be influenced by the innovation efforts within GSC participators in the preceding stage.…”

Will technological innovation uncertainty affect the distribution of benefits from low‐carbon innovation activities in industrial clusters?—A study based on gray Shapley values

“…These stakeholders jointly influence the ultimate performance of low-carbon technology innovation collaboration in industrial clusters (Guo et al, 2020;Pan et al, 2019;Tambosi et al, 2020). Existing literatures have studied the games of multi-stakeholder in the process of technological innovation in industrial clusters (Hosseini-Motlagh et al, 2022;Zhu et al, 2021). However, few of them have examined the distribution of benefits among the technology stakeholders of the industrial cluster, and there is also a lack of adequate analysis of the impact of the uncertainty of low carbon technology innovation on the ultimate innovation performance.…”

Research on collaborative decision making of China's photovoltaic supply chain based on competition policy

“…Considering the limited rationality of the supply chain entities in the photovoltaic industry, many experts and scholars use differential game models to study the competition and cooperation issues in the supply chain. Others performed studies on cooperation in the supply chain by constructing differential game models in the forms of performance, incentives, and contracts (Xu et al, 2022;Liu et al, 2022;Zhu, G., 2021). The differential game model can be used to study the competition and cooperation problems in the supply chain.…”