This study investigated optimal green operation and information leakage decisions in a green supply chain system. The system consists of one supplier, one leader retailer 1, one follower retailer 2, and the government. In this system, the government subsidizes each retailer based on the selling price of the product. The supplier is subject to a yield uncertainty process. The suppler decides whether to leak leader retailer 1′s order quantity to follower retailer 2 or not. In this study, we first built a Stackelberg game to address the equilibrium green operation decisions, when the supplier has and has not information leakage behavior, respectively. Subsequently, we identify the supplier’s information leakage equilibrium and how such behavior affects retailers’ ex ante profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare through a numerical study. Interestingly, we obtained the following results: (1) Supplier leaks are the unique equilibrium of the supplier. The product’s green degree and wholesale price at supplier’s equilibrium are higher under information leakage than under no information leakage. (2) The supplier’s information leakage behavior is good for leader retailer 1 and bad for follower retailer 2. (3) Information leakage behavior increases both consumer surplus and social welfare under certain conditions. (4) In general, key system parameters (e.g., the subsidy rate, supply uncertainty, supply correlation, and forecast accuracies) positively correlate with consumer surplus and social welfare in the same direction, while they affect retailer 1′s and retailer 2′s ex ante profit in the opposite direction. These findings provide useful insights for businesses to manage demand forecast information and make decisions on the green level of the product in green supply chain management.
This paper investigates information leakage and financing simultaneously in a supply chain (SC) consisting of one capital-constrained supplier and two retailers with private demand-forecast signals. The supplier invests in corporate social responsibility (CSR) events and displays supply uncertainty. The supplier decides whether to leak information (L) or not (N). Additionally, the supplier has two financing strategies: bank credit financing (B) and trade credit financing (T). Thus, by combining the supplier’s information leakage and financing decisions, we formulated four possible strategies (i.e., NB, NT, LB, LT) and built a game analysis model to address the interaction of information leakage and financing decisions. We first provide the SC members’ optimal operational decisions (including the order quantity, the wholesale price and CSR effort level) under four strategies. Subsequently, we compare the profits of the suppliers and retailers under four strategies by combining analytical and numerical analysis. Several interesting results were found: (1) the supplier’s optimal wholesale price, CSR effort level, and profit under information leakage were higher than those under no information leakage; (2) the supplier’s financing decisions are dependent on the loan interest rate as low supply uncertainty and low supply correlation motivate the supplier to prefer choosing trade credit financing; and (3) finally, several interesting insights in managing SCs are provided.
In this paper, we study the green credit financing equilibrium in a green supply chain (GSC) with government subsidy and supply uncertainty. The GSC system is composed of one manufacturer, two retailers, one bank, and the government. The manufacturer is subject to both supply uncertainty and limited capital. The manufacturer invests in the R&D of green products and borrows loans from the bank. The government subsidizes banks to encourage banks to provide loans to manufacturers with lower interest rates, which is termed “green credit financing”. The two retailers decide their order quantities with horizontal competition or horizontal cooperation. We first developed a Stackelberg model to investigate the green credit financing equilibriums (i.e., the interest rate of the bank, the manufacturer’s product green degree and wholesale price, and the retailers’ order quantity) under horizontal competition and horizontal cooperation, respectively. Subsequently, we analyzed how the subsidy interest rate, supply uncertainty, and supply correlation affect financing decisions regarding equilibrium green credit. We found that a high subsidy interest rate leads to a low interest rate of bank and the manufacturer can set a high level of green product and high wholesale price, while the retailers can set a high order quantity. Finally, we compared the green credit financing equilibriums under horizontal competition with those under horizontal cooperation using numerical and analytical methods. We found that, in general, the optimal decisions and profits of bank and SC members, consumer surplus, and social welfare under horizontal competition are higher than those under horizontal cooperation. The findings in this research could provide valuable insights for the management of capital-constrained GSCs with government subsidies and supply uncertainty in a competing market.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.