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In this paper, we examine the pricing strategies in a two-stage supply chain with two competitive manufacturers and one retailer. We address six game models: the centralized model (Model I), the MS-Bertrand model (Model II), the MS-Stackelberg model (Model III), the RS-Bertrand model (Model IV), the RS-Stackelberg model (Model V) and the cost-sharing contract model (Model VI) to explore the optimal pricing strategies of substitutable products. We address the optimal green manufacturing level, retail prices, wholesale prices and the profits of supply chain members as well as the whole supply chain under different models. Numerical examples are provided to demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed models. First the impact of green investment on the green manufacturing level and supply chain performance is examined. Then the impact of price elasticity, cross-price sensitivity and green manufacturing coefficient on the green manufacturing level is analyzed. We find that the centralized model is the best, and the cost-sharing contract model will be better than the four decentralized models when the cost-sharing proposition is in a certain interval. Additionally, in decentralized scenarios, the Stackelberg model has an advantage for manufacturers while the Bertrand model is superior for the retailer. Our results also indicate that green manufacturing will benefit the manufacturer involved in green investment.

High-energy lithium-ion batteries are being increasingly applied in the electric vehicle industry but suffer from rapid capacity fading and a high risk of thermal runaway. The crosstalk phenomenon between the...

This paper investigates a service supply chain (SC) consisting of a service provider (SP) who is in charge of carbon emission reduction and service, and a service integrator (SI) who is responsible for low-carbon advertising, considering corporate social responsibility (CSR). Given that SP shares SI's advertising cost, SI may have three types of cost sharing decisions, namely, not sharing any cost of SP (contract PA), sharing SP's emission reduction cost (contract PAIE), or sharing SP's service cost (contract PAIS). We establish three differential game models to explore the optimal decisions, and identify the conditions under which SP and SI would provide positive participation rates. Our findings demonstrate that consumers' low-carbon preference, and chain members' marginal profits and CSR behaviors significantly influence the optimal solutions. Furthermore, we indicate that two-way contracts (contracts PAIE and PAIS) could benefit the entire service SC and its members. Specifically, SI prefers contract PAIE when SP's service cost efficiency is lower, whereas he would rather choose contract PAIS under a higher one. More importantly, contracts PAIS and PAIE would be the potential equilibrium contract when SI has a relatively high marginal profit. When it is sufficiently low, contracts PAIE and PA would be the possible equilibrium contract.

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