Pricing decisions for substitutable products with green manufacturing in a competitive supply chain

Ma, Peng; Zhang, Chen; Hong, Xianpei; Xu, Henry

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.02.152

Cited by 100 publications

(42 citation statements)

References 44 publications

(49 reference statements)

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“…Stucki found that only 19% of the highest energy cost firms have positive marginal productivity of GSC technology investment [12]. Ma, Zhang, Hong, et al considered a two-stage supply chain composed of two manufacturers producing green products and ordinary products, respectively, and one retailer, and studied the price and green degree decision-making models under six modes, including different decision-making sequences and green investment cost sharing [13]. Zhang, Liu, Zhang, et al studied investment in the preservation technology of perishable goods under the monopoly of a manufacturer and a retailer, and proposed a technology investment cost-revenue sharing contract to coordinate the benefits of all parties [14].…”

Section: Green Technsology Investment Of Supply Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Closed-Loop Supply Chain Network Equilibrium Model with Subsidy on Green Supply Chain Technology Investment

Zhang

2019

Sustainability

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The green supply chain (GSC) can effectively reduce the waste of resources and avoid environmental pollution. For a closed-loop supply chain network consisting of multiple manufacturers, multiple retailers, and multiple consumer and recycling markets, we assume that retailers are responsible for the recycling of used products, manufacturers use raw materials to produce new products and recycled products for remanufacturing, and government departments subsidize all manufacturers and retailers for GSC technology investment. Then, the equilibrium conditions of manufacturers, retailers, demand markets, and recycling markets are obtained by using the variational inequality method, complementarity theorem, and Nash equilibrium theory, and the variational inequality model of the closed-loop supply chain network multiphase equilibrium is established. Based on numerical simulation, the optimal technology investment decision of green supply chain under different government subsidy rates, and the influence of market structure and enterprise cost asymmetry on the equilibrium solution of supply chain network are analyzed. The results show that government subsidies can effectively promote enterprises to upgrade their level of GSC technology investment. The intensification of enterprise competition and the asymmetry of enterprise costs will affect the composition of enterprise profits and the allocation of profits between enterprises, and the former will weaken the effect of government subsidies.

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Section: Green Technsology Investment Of Supply Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Closed-Loop Supply Chain Network Equilibrium Model with Subsidy on Green Supply Chain Technology Investment

Zhang

2019

Sustainability

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“…e manufacturer determines the green degree of products and the wholesale price while the two retailers determine the retail prices. As discussed earlier, we investigate the models with three different vertical SC power structures including the manufacturer Stackelberg, the retailer Stackelberg, and the vertical Nash, respectively [14,16]. In addition, Bertrand or Stackelberg competition is applied between the two retailers under different horizontal power structures.…”

Section: The Decentralized Supply Chain Casementioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition, Bertrand or Stackelberg competition is applied between the two retailers under different horizontal power structures. Table 2 shows that there exist six game theory-based models with different vertical and horizontal power structures [14,16]. Both models in the first row of Table 2 refer to the authority relationships under which the vertical competition is the manufacturer Stackelberg.…”

Section: The Decentralized Supply Chain Casementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Heydari [13] addresses the coordinated decision problem in a green three-level SC with two selling channels. Ma et al [14] examine the pricing strategies in a two-stage SC with two competitive manufacturers and one retailer under manufacturer Stackelberg, retailer Stackelberg, and cost-sharing contract games. Taking into account a SC comprising one common manufacturer and two competing retailers, Hosseini-Motlagh et al [15] investigate the optimal green degree of products and the optimal green guarantee periods in a SC with both nongreen and green products.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Coordination of a Green Supply Chain with One Manufacturer and Two Competing Retailers under Different Power Structures

Wang

Liu

Zhang

et al. 2019

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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e main objective of this research is to examine the role of power relationship in a two-level green supply chain which is made up of one shared manufacturer and two competitive retailers. We develop six game theory-based models to explore the members' operational decisions in a supply chain taking into account three vertical power structures (Manufacturer Stackelberg, Retailer Stackelberg, and Vertical Nash) as well as two retailers' horizontal power structure (Bertrand or Stackelberg competition). en, we design a two-part tariff contract which can encourage the supply chain members to promote cooperation and eventually coordinate the decentralized green supply chain under each power structure. Lastly, to further discuss the impact of the green awareness of consumers and the greening cost on supply chain players' operational decisions and profits, we employ some numerical examples to conduct sensitivity analysis. e main conclusions are as follows. Firstly, the impact of power structure on the supply chain players' operational decisions and profits mainly depends on the substitutability of the green products, the green awareness of consumers, and the greening cost for the manufacturer. Secondly, the more power the manufacturer has, the lower product greenness will be set. irdly, the consumer's environmental awareness (the greening cost) positively (negatively) influences the manufacturer's product greenness and wholesale price, the retailers' sales prices, and the player's profits under each power structure. Finally, the developed two-part tariff contract is practicable and beneficial for both the manufacturer and the two retailers.

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“…In India, the government is planning to electrify most of the new vehicles by 2030, which forces traditional gasoline automobile manufacturers to redesign their products. Other national strategies such as "German industry 4.0" and "Made in China 2025" also show unprecedented determination for the development of green manufacturing [2].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Joint Emission Reduction Strategy in Green Supply Chain under Environmental Regulation

2020

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Under the threat of global warming, joint emission reduction strategy has been widely adopted as an effective solution for the industry to guarantee environmental sustainability. In the practice of supply chain, environmental regulations and supply chain contracts are applied with the attempt to improve environmental performance. However, whether these measures are actually effective remains unanswered. In this paper, we study a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer adopting joint emission reduction strategy. We first investigate under what circumstance the environmental regulation can effectively result in higher emission reduction efforts. The result shows that when the cost coefficient satisfies certain conditions, the increase of penalty or subsidy can lead to more investment in emission reduction. In addition, if the environmental impact caused by the production process is extremely high, the enforcement of the regulation is ineffective. We also explore how the cost-revenue-sharing contract affects the emission reduction strategy and the coordination of the members in the supply chain. The results suggest that the incentive effect of environmental regulation is more effective when the supply chain coordination contract exists. Numerical experiments are also presented to verify our analytical conclusions.

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Pricing decisions for substitutable products with green manufacturing in a competitive supply chain

Cited by 100 publications

References 44 publications

Closed-Loop Supply Chain Network Equilibrium Model with Subsidy on Green Supply Chain Technology Investment

Closed-Loop Supply Chain Network Equilibrium Model with Subsidy on Green Supply Chain Technology Investment

Coordination of a Green Supply Chain with One Manufacturer and Two Competing Retailers under Different Power Structures

Joint Emission Reduction Strategy in Green Supply Chain under Environmental Regulation

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