Information Leakage and Financing Decisions in a Supply Chain with Corporate Social Responsibility and Supply Uncertainty

Abstract

This paper investigates information leakage and financing simultaneously in a supply chain (SC) consisting of one capital-constrained supplier and two retailers with private demand-forecast signals. The supplier invests in corporate social responsibility (CSR) events and displays supply uncertainty. The supplier decides whether to leak information (L) or not (N). Additionally, the supplier has two financing strategies: bank credit financing (B) and trade credit financing (T). Thus, by combining the supplier’s information leakage and financing decisions, we formulated four possible strategies (i.e., NB, NT, LB, LT) and built a game analysis model to address the interaction of information leakage and financing decisions. We first provide the SC members’ optimal operational decisions (including the order quantity, the wholesale price and CSR effort level) under four strategies. Subsequently, we compare the profits of the suppliers and retailers under four strategies by combining analytical and numerical analysis. Several interesting results were found: (1) the supplier’s optimal wholesale price, CSR effort level, and profit under information leakage were higher than those under no information leakage; (2) the supplier’s financing decisions are dependent on the loan interest rate as low supply uncertainty and low supply correlation motivate the supplier to prefer choosing trade credit financing; and (3) finally, several interesting insights in managing SCs are provided.

Corporate Financing Constraints and Information Disclosure: An Analysis of Corporate Investment Dilemmas under the Wave of Counter-Globalization

“…As the pace of socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics accelerates and market allocation occupies a dominant position in resource allocation, the transparency and openness of the market environment becomes a necessary condition to adapt to market allocation of resources. This [11]. The Program stipulates that the exchange mainly evaluates the rewards and punishments of listed companies and provides a certain degree of public disclosure of accurate, complete, and legal information to meet the principle of transparency and openness of market transactions.…”

Mechanism of supply chain coordination based on price discount with privacy protection in one-supplier-one-buyer system

“…Although information sharing is the key to achieving enterprise cooperation, driven by the pursuit of individual interests, enterprises may make individual optimal choices that are contrary to the overall optimal. Even, information leakage exists in the supply chain system [9], which will lead to various fraud events, resulting in the loss of enterprise funds.…”