Abstract:Considering the opening up of carbon emission trading market, this article investigates the government's role in allocating the appropriate emission quota to maximize social members' (including enterprises and customers) utilities and analyzes how the emission-dependent enterprise improves revenues of both itself and the whole system through supply chain collaboration. Within this, a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one emission-dependent manufacturer and one retailer is discussed. Taking revenue-sharing… Show more
“…In the field of the green supply chain, with which this study is concerned, Wang and Zhao designed a contract on revenue-sharing between a manufacturing company and retailer and realized a Pareto improvement based on consumers' preference for low-carbon products and enterprises' active implementation of measures to reduce emissions [22]. Cao et al designed a contract on revenue-sharing based on different emission reduction policy environments to effectively improve the profits of supply chain members [23,24].…”
In the market, once consumers have a low-carbon preference, they will choose green low-carbon products. The market demand for green products is not only related to product price, but also consumers’ low-carbon preference. In this way, enterprise has to consider the cost of carbon emissions in the process of production and operation. In this paper, we consider a two-level supply chain system composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. The supply chain system can determine the price of products and the level of carbon emission reduction through different supply chain contracts: wholesale price contract and revenue sharing contract. However, the power control structure of a manufacturer and a retailer is different, which will further affect the decision-making strategy of the supply chain system. We set up four models (Wholesale Price—NM and NR, and Revenue-Sharing—SR and SM) of the supply chain with carbon emission reduction, and calculated and analyzed. The results show that firstly, regardless of whether the manufacturer's power control structure or the retailer power structure is dominant, the manufacturer wholesale price with a contract on revenue-sharing is always higher than on wholesale price, and it is inversely proportional to the revenue-sharing proportion. Secondly, under the two power control structures, the carbon emission level of the manufacturer with a contract on revenue-sharing is always lower than on wholesale price, and it gradually decreases with the increase of the revenue-sharing proportion of the manufacturers. Thirdly, when the retailer dominates the supply chain, the retailer selling price with a contract on revenue-sharing is always higher than on wholesale price. Under the manufacturer's power control structure, when the revenue-sharing ratio is small, the retailer selling price with a contract on revenue-sharing is higher than on wholesale price; when the revenue-sharing ratio is large, the retailer selling price with a contract on revenue-sharing is lower than on wholesale price. Finally, the validity of the model is verified by an example, and the sensitivity of the parameters is analyzed.
“…In the field of the green supply chain, with which this study is concerned, Wang and Zhao designed a contract on revenue-sharing between a manufacturing company and retailer and realized a Pareto improvement based on consumers' preference for low-carbon products and enterprises' active implementation of measures to reduce emissions [22]. Cao et al designed a contract on revenue-sharing based on different emission reduction policy environments to effectively improve the profits of supply chain members [23,24].…”
In the market, once consumers have a low-carbon preference, they will choose green low-carbon products. The market demand for green products is not only related to product price, but also consumers’ low-carbon preference. In this way, enterprise has to consider the cost of carbon emissions in the process of production and operation. In this paper, we consider a two-level supply chain system composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. The supply chain system can determine the price of products and the level of carbon emission reduction through different supply chain contracts: wholesale price contract and revenue sharing contract. However, the power control structure of a manufacturer and a retailer is different, which will further affect the decision-making strategy of the supply chain system. We set up four models (Wholesale Price—NM and NR, and Revenue-Sharing—SR and SM) of the supply chain with carbon emission reduction, and calculated and analyzed. The results show that firstly, regardless of whether the manufacturer's power control structure or the retailer power structure is dominant, the manufacturer wholesale price with a contract on revenue-sharing is always higher than on wholesale price, and it is inversely proportional to the revenue-sharing proportion. Secondly, under the two power control structures, the carbon emission level of the manufacturer with a contract on revenue-sharing is always lower than on wholesale price, and it gradually decreases with the increase of the revenue-sharing proportion of the manufacturers. Thirdly, when the retailer dominates the supply chain, the retailer selling price with a contract on revenue-sharing is always higher than on wholesale price. Under the manufacturer's power control structure, when the revenue-sharing ratio is small, the retailer selling price with a contract on revenue-sharing is higher than on wholesale price; when the revenue-sharing ratio is large, the retailer selling price with a contract on revenue-sharing is lower than on wholesale price. Finally, the validity of the model is verified by an example, and the sensitivity of the parameters is analyzed.
“…Green innovation is defined as any product or process that is innovative in nature and when incorporated into a production activity has the potential to enhance its environmental sustainability (Chen et al ., ; Schiederig et al ., ). The recent concerns over climate change (Lhotka et al ., ), carbon emissions (Cao et al ., ) and depletion of natural capital (Kurniawan and Managi, ), along with the increased public interest in sustainable consumption (Liu et al ., ), have led to a renewed focus on the promotion of green innovations. Hence, today, fostering (green) innovation capacity is considered a key element of a transition towards a sustainable development by both policy makers (Nhamo, ) and the business sector (Schaltegger et al ., ).…”
This work is based on the conjecture that multiple motivational pathways might lead to the adoption of green innovations. A sequence of two studies was designed to identify motives driving farmers to adopt green innovations. Study 1 aimed at the development of a scale assessing potential adoption motives. Study 2using this measureexamined which of these motives predict farmers' adoption behavior. Study 1 uncovered five factors that affect adoption decision: adaptation to the social process of innovation diffusion, environmental concern, convenience, economic incentives and the internal need to pursue change. Study 2 showed that perception of the convenience of an innovation is a significant antecedent of farmers' green innovativeness. Economic drivers, farmers' environmental concern and their need to pursue novelty are also positively associated with aspects of green innovativeness. Our results underscore the multidimensional nature of green innovativeness and generate challenging directions for future research in the field of sustainable development.
Serious environmental issues have drawn the attention of the agricultural sector. Consumers’ concerns about their personal health and food safety have stimulated the demand for green agri-food, which has also made it important to focus on the green agri-food supply chain to improve the food quality and reduce the associated environmental concerns. This paper discusses coordination issues of the green agri-food supply chain under the background of farmers’ green farming and retailers’ green marketing, and the impact of a revenue-sharing contract on key decisions of supply chain participants. On the basis of the two-echelon green agri-food supply chain composed of a farmer and a retailer, a revenue-sharing contract was established that takes the cost of farmer’s green farming and retailer’s green marketing into account. Through the comparison of the model results, it is concluded that the revenue-sharing contract is beneficial to not only increase the greening level, but also improve both the farmer’s profit and the retailer’s profit. Moreover, the effectiveness of the revenue-sharing contract is positively correlated with consumers’ sensitivity to the greening level. Finally, the conclusion is verified by numerical simulation and some management suggestions are given.
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