Striving as Suffering: Schopenhauer’s A Priori Argument for Pessimism

Abstract

This paper aims to clarify Schopenhauer's a priori argument for pessimism and, to an extent, rescue it from standard objections in secondary literature. I argue that if we separate out the various strands of Schopenhauer's pessimism, we hit upon problems and counterexamples stemming from psychology. For example, instances where striving (willing) does not appear to equate to suffering, which puts pressure on the Schopenhauerian claim that human life, qua instantiation of the will, is painful. Schopenhauer's sensitivity to the complexities of human psychology means that he may be able to stave off such concerns. However, this reveals that true force of Schopenhauer's argument lies in the manner in which he combines an a priori formulation with empirical observation. I conclude that, though not unproblematic, Schopenhauer's argument in its most refined forms offers a deep articulation of the human condition, and warrants serious consideration.

Virtue and the Problem of Egoism in Schopenhauer's Moral Philosophy

“…This definition is, I believe, closest to how the word 'selfish' is ordinarily used. See Hassan (2021) for an analysis of Schopenhauer's primary argument for this view. For an interesting defence of the view that there is, in fact, an undiagnosed tension between morality and renunciation 7 in Schopenhauer's philosophy, see Shapshay (2019).…”

“…I have previously argued that Schopenhauer's moral philosophy is best interpreted as a form of virtue ethics, though a distinctive form in many respects (Hassan, 2019). In On the Basis of Morality, as well as book four of The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer advances a "morality of disposition [Moralität der Gesinnung]" (WWR II: 590) ultimately rooted in compassion, and its two cardinal virtues of justice [Gerechtigkeit] and love of humanity [Menschenliebe].…”

O Mal Da Morte No Pessimismo: Considerações a Partir De Arthur Schopenhauer E David Benatar

“…Embora o pessimismo de Schopenhauer possa envolver diversas outras teses, o que enseja até mesmo diferentes noções de pessimismo a partir de sua obra (DEBONA, 2016), minha preocupação é com essa tese fundamental, em defesa da qual o filósofo ofertou diversos argumentos. Tratarei aqui, contudo, apenas do argumento a priori desenvolvido por Schopenhauer entre os parágrafos 56 e 59 do Tomo I de O mundo como vontade e como representação (2005), o qual alguns consideram como o argumento mais importante do autor em defesa do pessimismo (BEISER, 2016) e é amplamente discutido por comentadores(JANAWAY, 1999;BEISER, 2016;HASSAN, 2021; Simmons, no prelo).…”

Schopenhauer's Pessimism

“…This objection is raised byYoung (1987: 58),Cartwright (1988: 57-9),Soll (1988: 112),Young (2005: 217- 18), andSoll (2012: 302-4). It is discussed byJanaway (1999: 329-30) andHassan (2021Hassan ( : 1492).…”