This paper aims to clarify Schopenhauer's a priori argument for pessimism and, to an extent, rescue it from standard objections in secondary literature. I argue that if we separate out the various strands of Schopenhauer's pessimism, we hit upon problems and counterexamples stemming from psychology. For example, instances where striving (willing) does not appear to equate to suffering, which puts pressure on the Schopenhauerian claim that human life, qua instantiation of the will, is painful. Schopenhauer's sensitivity to the complexities of human psychology means that he may be able to stave off such concerns. However, this reveals that true force of Schopenhauer's argument lies in the manner in which he combines an a priori formulation with empirical observation. I conclude that, though not unproblematic, Schopenhauer's argument in its most refined forms offers a deep articulation of the human condition, and warrants serious consideration.
The aim of this paper is to elucidate Schopenhauer's moral philosophy in terms of an ethics of virtue, and to consider its plausibility relative to competing traditions. The paper consists of three sections. In the first section of the paper I outline three major objections Schopenhauer raises to Kant's moral philosophy, and argue that these plausible criticisms are in essence the same concerns that gave rise to the revival of 'virtue ethics' as a proposed distinctive school of ethical thought in the twentieth century. In section two I extract from these criticisms a sketch of Schopenhauer's own position, distinguishing a brand of virtue ethics from competing versions within the tradition, in which compassion is emphasised as the root of all virtue. I then consider the strengths of such a view. In the third and final section I consider and respond to one possible shortcoming of the ethical theory discussed, and adjudicate between competing solutions in the secondary literature. I conclude that refined forms of Schopenhauer's ethical views offer rich and plausible insights into both virtue and vice which have received less attention than they deserve. Hence, Schopenhauer warrants more serious concern in contemporary discussions of virtue ethics alongside the likes of Aristotle, Hume and Nietzsche.
This paper focuses on Nietzsche’s claim that suffering is closely related to the realization of certain perfectionist values, such as artistic excellence. According to Bernard Reginster, creative achievement consists in overcoming suffering, and therefore, suffering is an essential ingredient of creative achievement. Because suffering forms an essential part of a valuable whole in this way, Reginster argues that we must in turn value suffering ‘for its own sake’. This paper argues that Reginster’s position is open to the following objection: from the fact that suffering is an essential part of a valuable whole, it does not follow that suffering is itself valuable. Rather, by taking advantage of the principle of organic unities, it would have to form an essential part of a valuable whole in a particular way. The author considers two ways the principle might be attributed to Nietzsche’s views on suffering: first, as an ‘enabling condition’, in which suffering allows for a whole that outweighs its disvalue; and second, as ‘a contributor’, in which suffering positively contributes value to the whole. The paper explores how Nietzsche’s ethics turns out to be crucially informed by this conceptual distinction.
By drawing upon contemporary debates in the theory of value, in this article I explore the evidence for taking Nietzsche to defend the view that rarity—at least under certain qualified conditions—matters for its own sake. I argue that this evidence is compelling, and that many intuitive objections to the view can be deflected by challenging the axiological assumptions that motivate them. The question concerning the value of rarity has significant evaluative implications concerning Nietzsche's famed critique of morality, and in particular the component of equality. While Nietzsche is traditionally interpreted as rejecting equality in virtue of its “leveling-down” effects upon certain perfectionist values, I claim that if rarity is itself valuable then we are left with a second critique of equality: that it undercuts the value of peculiarity. I explore the extent and significance of this objection in the final section of the article.
Achievement clearly plays a significant role in people's lives in some form or another. We admire Nobel prize winners, Olympic athletes, scientists who make groundbreaking discoveries, great novelists, war heroes, musicians, and so forth. But when asked (1) what achievements consist in; and (2) what makes them valuable, giving a comprehensive answer is likely a more complicated task than first thought. These are questions that have not received as much philosophical attention as, for example, the nature of knowledge, pleasure, autonomy, and other typical nonmoral values. This should strike us as odd, given that achievement frequently appears alongside these values on "objective list" or "perfectionist" accounts of what constitutes well-being or a good life for a human.In this clearly written and well structured book, Gwen Bradford sets the task of answering precisely these questions in one of the first in-depth and systematic accounts of achievement and its value. Although the literature dealing with this topic is relatively small, the book engages with competing views from the likes of Thomas Hurka, Joseph Raz, and Simon Keller. In some respects, Bradford's own position complements that of these competing views. However, the most significant contribution that Achievement makes to this debate is to skillfully single out which aspects are worth developing and which are not. Ultimately, the book attempts to demonstrate that the current theories regarding the nature and value of achievement can take us only so far.In the first chapters of the book, Bradford seeks to give a descriptive account of what achievements consist in by considering their shared characteristics, arguing that contemporary accounts are unsatisfactory in overlooking this similarity. Bradford persuasively argues that for something to count as an achievement in the relevant sense, a number of conditions must be met. First, and least controversially, they must involve the successful attainment of one's goal. Although there may be some value to be found in certain failures (Bradford discusses this in the final chapter), and failures may involve some related achievements, achievement is taken to necessarily involve success.Second, achievement must involve the overcoming of significant difficulty, which Bradford characterizes in terms of "requiring some sufficient degree of effort." After all, successfully tying one's shoelace or raising one's arm do not intuitively count as achievements in the relevant sense (i.e., as worthy of admiration). It is likely that this is because they
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