Schopenhauer's Pessimism

Abstract

Optimism and pessimism are two diametrically opposed views about the value of existence. Optimists maintain that existence is better than non-existence, while pessimists hold that it is worse. Arthur Schopenhauer put forward a variety of arguments against optimism and for pessimism. I will offer a synoptic reading of these arguments, which aims to show that while Schopenhauer's case against optimism primarily focuses on the value or disvalue of life's contents, his case for pessimism focuses on the ways in which life as a whole is structurally defective.Optimists seek to provide a theoretical justification for this suffering. They might, to this end, insist that this is the best of all possible worlds or else take the existence of our world to be 'justified by itself and therefore praise it' (SW 3: 187/WWR 2: 179). All is well, they might declare; 'Whatever IS, is RIGHT'. 1 For since 'everything which exists be according to a good order and for the best', there can be 'no such thing as real ill in the universe, nothing ill with respect to the whole'. 2 'All partial Evil' is thus 'universal Good'. 3 Optimists maintain, moreover, that human existence is 'a gift to be gratefully acknowledged, given by a supreme good governed by wisdom and therefore intrinsically praiseworthy, laudable and joyful' (SW 3: 653/WWR 2: 585). But they needn't deny that our existence contains various trials and tribulations; they simply take them to be accidental and avoidable, while life itself is taken to be 'a desirable state', the goal of which is to be happy (SW 3: 671/WWR 2: 600).Pessimists, on the other hand, aim to show that there can be no practical compensation for suffering. They might insist that our world, far from being the best, 'is in fact the worst of all possible worlds' (SW 3: 669/WWR 2: 598), or otherwise declare that 'we should be sorry rather than glad about the existence of the world; that its non-existence would be preferable to its existence; [and] that it is something that fundamentally should not be' (SW 3: 661/WWR 2: 592, see also SW 3: 187-8/WWR 2: 179). Pessimists maintain, moreover, that human existence 'far from having the character of a gift, has the completely opposite character of guilty indebtedness. The collection of this debt appears in the form of the urgent requirements, tortured desires, and endless need, all introduced by human