Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees

Ratliff, Thomas

doi:10.1007/s00355-003-0209-y

Cited by 53 publications

(43 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…In addition to these questions, other procedures, especially those that allow for proportional representation (Potthoff and Brams 1998;Brams and Fishburn 2002;Ratliff, 2003Ratliff, , 2006, should be considered. Just as approval voting in single-winner elections stimulated considerable theoretical and empirical research beginning a generation ago (Brams and Fishburn 1978, 1983, 2005Weber 1995;Brams and Sanver 2006), we hope that the minimax procedure generates new research on using approval balloting to elect committees under the minimax procedure.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 98%

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A minimax procedure for electing committees

2007

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Notice that a larger minimax or minisum committee may not include a smaller committee; for example, 011 does not include 100. This failure of monotonicity-larger committees may not include smaller committees as subsets-is shared with other voting procedures, like the Kemeny rule, that have also been proposed to elect committees(Ratliff 2003).…”

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confidence: 98%

A minimax procedure for electing committees

2007

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“…Furthermore, C(P) will be called the approval compromise at profile P, and elements of S(P) will be called satisfactory programs at P. 5 For the role played by non-separability in multiple referendum, the reader may refer to Lacy and Niou (2000); Ratliff (2003Ratliff ( , 2006; Hodge and Schwallier (2006), and Laffond and Lainé (2010). 6 The proof is obvious in case where N is odd.…”

Section: Approval α-Compromisementioning

confidence: 99%

Searching for a Compromise in Multiple Referendum

Laffond

Lainé

2011

Group Decis Negot

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We consider a multiple referendum setting where voters cast approval ballots, in which they either approve or disapprove of each of finitely many dichotomous issues. A program is a set of socially approved issues. Assuming that individual preferences over programs are derived from ballots by means of the Hamming distance criterion, we consider two alternative notions of compromise. The majoritarian compromise is the set of all programs supported by the largest majority of voters at the minimum utility loss. A program is an approval compromise if it is supported by the highest number of voters at a utility loss at most half of the maximal achievable one. We investigate the conditions under which issue-wise majority voting allows for reaching each type of compromise. Finally, we argue that our results hold for many other preferences that are consistent with the observed ballots.

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“…(iii)-the rules based on the Condorcet principle which elect the subset(s) of candidates such that no member is beaten in pairwise comparisons by any outside contender. To have a quick overview of this family of multiwinner voting rules, the reader may refer to the works of Barberà and Coelho (2008), Elkind et al (2011Elkind et al ( , 2015, Fishburn (1981), Gehrlein (1985), Kamwa (2017), Kamwa and Merlin (2018), Kaymak and Sanver (2003), Ratli (2003), among others.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…That is the reason why other extensions of this concept have been suggested in the literature. We refer the reader to the works of Barberà and Coelho (2008), Kamwa (2017), Ratli (2003) for more information on these notions.…”

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confidence: 99%