Given a collection of individual preferences on a set of candidates and a desired number of winners, a multi-winner voting rule outputs groups of winners, which we call committees. In this paper, we consider five multi-winner voting rules widely studied in the literature of social choice theory: the k-Plurality rule, the k-Borda rule, the k-Negative Plurality rule, the Bloc rule, and the Chamberlin-Courant rule. The objective of this paper is to provide a comparison of these multi-winner voting rules according to many principles by taking into account a probabilistic approach using the well-known Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) assumption. We first evaluate the probability that each pair of the considered voting rules selects the same unique committee in order to identify which multi-winner rules are the most likely to agree for a given number of candidates and a fixed target size of the committee. In this matter, our results show that the Chamberlin-Courant rule and the k-Plurality rule on one side, and the k-Borda rule and the Bloc rule on the other side, are the pairs of rules that most agree in comparison to other pairs. Furthermore, we evaluate the probability of every multi-winner voting rule selecting the Condorcet committee à la Gehrlein when it exists. The Condorcet committee à la Gehrlein is a fixed-size committee such that every member defeats every non-member in

Hermite processes are self-similar processes with stationary increments; the Hermite process of order 1 is fractional Brownian motion (fBm) and the Hermite process of order 2 is the Rosenblatt process. In this paper we consider a class of impulsive neutral stochastic functional differential equations with variable delays driven by Rosenblatt process with index {H\in(\frac{1}{2},1)} , which is a special case of a self-similar process with long-range dependence. More precisely, we prove an existence and uniqueness result, and we establish some conditions, ensuring the exponential decay to zero in mean square for the mild solution by means of the Banach fixed point theory. Finally, an illustrative example is given to demonstrate the effectiveness of the obtained result.

This paper presents the conditions required for a profile in order to never exhibit either the strong or the strict Borda paradoxes under all weighted scoring rules in three-candidate elections. The main particularity of our paper is that all the conclusions are extracted from the differences of votes between candidates in pairwise majority elections. This way allows us to answer new questions and provide an organized knowledge of the conditions under which a given profile never shows one of the two paradoxes.

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In this paper, we consider the controllability of certain class of non-autonomous neutral evolution stochastic functional differential equations, with time varying delays, driven by a fractional Brownian motion in a separable real Hilbert space. Sufficient conditions for controllability are obtained by employing a fixed point approach. A practical example is provided to illustrate the viability of the abstract result of this work.

In this paper, we investigate a class of time-dependent neutral stochastic functional differential equations with finite delay driven by Rosenblatt process in a real separable Hilbert space. We prove the existence of unique mild solution by the well-known Banach fixed point principle. At the end we provide a practical example in order to illustrate the viability of our result.

In this paper we establish the link between strategy-proofness and unanimity in a domain of private good economies with single-peaked preferences. We introduce a new condition and we prove that if this new property together with the requirement of citizen sovereignty are held, a social choice function satisfies strategy-proofness if and only if it is unanimous. As an implication, we show that strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity become equivalent. We also give applications to implementation literature: We provide a full characterization for standard Nash implementation and partially honest Nash implementation and we determine a certain equivalence among these theories.

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