The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency

Diss, Mostapha; Kamwa, Éric; Tlidi, Abdelmonaim

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3198184

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 48 publications

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“…The Condorcet committee à la Gehrlein does not always exist, and as pointed by Diss et al (2018), it has been suggested in order to avoid committees with dominated members. For more information on Condorcet committee, the reader can refer in particular to Barberà and Coelho (2008), Kamwa (2017), and Ratliff (2003).…”

Section: Generalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social acceptability of Condorcet committees

Diss¹,

Mahajne

2020

Mathematical Social Sciences

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We define and examine the concept of social acceptability of committees, in multi-winner elections context. We say that a committee is socially acceptable if each member in this committee is socially acceptable, i.e., the number of voters who rank her in their top half of the candidates is at least as large as the number of voters who rank her in the least preferred half, otherwise she is unacceptable. We focus on the social acceptability of Condorcet committees, where each committee member beats every nonmember by a majority, and we show that a Condorcet committee may be completely unacceptable, i.e., all its members are unacceptable. However, if the preferences of the voters are single-peaked or singlecaved and the committee size is not "too large" then a Condorcet committee must be socially acceptable, but if the preferences are single-crossing or group-separable, then a Condorcet committee may be socially acceptable but may not. Furthermore, we evaluate the probability for a Condorcet committee, when it exists, to be socially (un)acceptable under Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) assumption. It turns to be that, in general, Condorcet committees are significantly exposed to social unacceptability.. AbstractWe define and examine the concept of social acceptability of committees, in multi-winner elections context. We say that a committee is socially acceptable if each member in this committee is socially acceptable, i.e., the number of voters who rank her in their top half of the candidates is at least as large as the number of voters who rank her in the least preferred half, otherwise she is unacceptable.We focus on the social acceptability of Condorcet committees, where each committee member beats every non-member by a majority, and we show that a Condorcet committee may be completely unacceptable, i.e., all its members are unacceptable. However, if the preferences of the voters are single-peaked or single-caved and the committee size is not "too large" then a Condorcet committee must be socially acceptable, but if the preferences are single-crossing or group-separable, then a Condorcet committee may be socially acceptable but may not. Furthermore, we evaluate the probability for a Condorcet committee, when it exists, to be socially (un)acceptable under Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) assumption. It turns to be that, in general, Condorcet committees are significantly exposed to social unacceptability.

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