Approval voting is a method of voting in which voters can vote for (“approve of”) as many candidates as they wish in an election. This article analyzes properties of this method and compares it with other single-ballot nonranked voting systems. Among the theorems proved is that approval voting is the most sincere and most strategyproof of all such voting systems; in addition, it is the only system that ensures the choice of a Condorcet majority candidate if the preferences of voters are dichotomous. Its probable empirical effects would be to (1) increase voter turnout, (2) increase the likelihood of a majority winner in plurality contests and thereby both obviate the need for runoff elections and reinforce the legitimacy of first-ballot outcomes, and (3) help centrist candidates, without at the same time denying voters the opportunity to express their support for more extremist candidates. The latter effect's institutional impact may be to weaken the two-party system yet preserve middle-of-the-road public policies of which most voters approve.

It is hardly surprising that variations on game theory are being developed at the same time that game theory's successes are being celebrated with the 1994 Nobel Prize in Economics.In Theory of Moves, Steven Brams provides ample evidence that these variations may be very successful in some new arenas. Beginning with some generally-accepted models and methods from game theory, Brams stirs in some appealingly simple decision principles, adds a few assumptions, and applies the blend to a very cleverly chosen array of examples. Further variations on Brams's recipes are certainly possible and may indeed be improvements, but, as this book clearly demonstrates, the meal is tasty and good for you too; future refinements are to be welcomed.The Theory of Moves comprises several methods for analyzing formal models that differ in several crucial ways from games, although they have much in common. Conflicts are seen as moving from state to state according to unilateral actions by the players--the initial state matters, and so can the relative powers of the players to continue, or stop, the process.The methodology is resolutely ordinal, which makes conflict models easier to specify and avoids utilities, mixed strategies, and other aspects of game theory that can be difficult to apply and to communicate. Many real-world problems, including many negotiations, represent natural domains of application for a theory like the Theory of Moves.Steven Brams is not the only developer of game-theory-related methodologies. For example, "non-myopic" calculations like those of Brams are included in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (Fang et al.

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Minimax procedure, Minisum procedure, Approval balloting, Committee election, Hamming distance,

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