Skilled Action and the Double Life of Intention

Shepherd, Joshua

doi:10.1111/phpr.12433

Cited by 71 publications

(45 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…One might worry that without these details filled in, we have a redescription of the interface problem, rather than a solution to it. Thus, Shepherd (, p. 10) proposes an alternative solution that has some P‐intentions taking both propositional and motoric formats: “The solution to the interface problem is that intentions lead a double life. Intentions can take propositionally formatted contents that enable their integration with propositional thought.…”

Section: Coordination Across the Levels: Determination And Interfacingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Shepherd () takes the positing of dual‐contents for (some) P‐intentions to be the best way to explain certain empirical results from sensorimotor adaptation paradigms (e.g., Taylor & Ivry ; McDougle et al ). In these experiments, participants are given the task of reaching toward a target.…”

Section: Coordination Across the Levels: Determination And Interfacingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…And intentions have motorically formatted contents that communicate in a fairly direct way with the operations of motoric-level action implementation." Shepherd (2017a) takes the positing of dual-contents for (some) P-intentions to be the best way to explain certain empirical results from sensorimotor adaptation paradigms (e.g., Taylor & Ivry 2011;McDougle et al 2016). In these experiments, participants are given the task of reaching toward a target.…”

Section: Interfacingmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Intentions: The dynamic hierarchical model revisited

Mylopoulos

Pacherie

2018

WIRES Cognitive Science

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Ten years ago, one of us proposed a dynamic hierarchical model of intentions that brought together philosophical work on intentions and empirical work on motor representations and motor control (Pacherie, 2008). The model distinguished among Distal intentions, Proximal intentions, and Motor intentions operating at different levels of action control (hence the name DPM model). This model specified the representational and functional profiles of each type of intention, as well their local and global dynamics, and the ways in which they interact. A core insight of the model was that action control is the result of integrated, coordinated activity across these levels of intention. Since the proposal of the model, empirical and theoretical works in philosophy and cognitive science have emerged that would seem to support and expand on this central insight. In particular, an updated understanding of the nature of sensorimotor processing and motor representations, as well as of how the different levels of intention and control interface and interact, allows for the further specification and precisification of the original DPM model. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Psychological Capacities Psychology > Motor Skill and Performance Philosophy > Action.

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Section: Coordination Across the Levels: Determination And Interfacingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Coordination Across the Levels: Determination And Interfacingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Interfacingmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Intentions: The dynamic hierarchical model revisited

Mylopoulos

Pacherie

2018

WIRES Cognitive Science

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“…At this point, it is worth mentioning briefly that in order to observe strong rationality constraints, I am not committed to a view where intentions must be formulated in propositional code. In this way, my approach to the format of intentional content is a bit different from B&S's and more in line with Shepherd (2017a) and Ferretti and Caiani (2018). At root, it seems to me plausible and even likely that we often plan our actions in a distinctly sensorimotor way-generating visual and motor imagery that allows us to weigh different actions and decide on the course of action that we are committed to implementing.…”

Section: The Rationality Constraintmentioning

confidence: 96%

Intention at the Interface

Fridland

2019

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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I identify and characterize the kind of personal-level control-structure that is most relevant for skilled action control, namely, what I call, "practical intention". I differentiate between practical intentions and general intentions not in terms of their function or timing but in terms of their content. I also highlight a distinction between practical intentions and other control mechanisms that are required to explain skilled action. I'll maintain that all intentions, general and practical, have the function specifying (and thus guiding according to those specifications), sustaining, and structuring action but that several functions that have been attributed to proximal intentions are actually implemented by other control mechanisms that are not themselves best identified as intentions. Specifically, I will claim that practical intentions do not initiate, monitor, specify or guide the fine-grained, online, kinematic aspects of action. Finally, I suggest that the way in which practical and general intentions should be differentiated is in terms of their content, where general intentions specify the overall goal, outcome, or end of an action as it is conceived of by the agent at a time, and practical intentions determine the means to that end. I conclude by providing empirical evidence to support this way of characterizing the intentions that "interface" with the mechanisms of motor control. Though this discussion has repercussions for action in general, I will limit my discussion to cases of skill.

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“…Now, the co-existence of many mental representational formats poses an issue that cannot be easily ignored. This issue concerns the integration between motoric states like motor representations and propositional states like intentions, both of which are needed in order to shape rational and accurate action performance (Burnston 2017; Butterfill and Sinigaglia 2014;Ferretti and Zipoli Caiani 2018;Mylopoulos and Pacherie 2016;Shepherd 2017).…”

Section: Representations In Vision and Actionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Between vision and action: introduction to the special issue

Ferretti

Caiani

2019

Synthese

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The study of the mind is quite a universe. Within this universe, we find the world of perception. Those who have landed in this world know that this is a place of wonderful and breathtaking landscapes. Among the landscapes, we can find within the world of perception, there is one we have to fear most: the jungle between vision and action. Two main kinds of adventurers are brave enough to pursue the routes in this jungle: the philosopher and the neuroscientist. This special issue is a logbook of this trip along the insidious and marvelous pathways between vision and action.

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Skilled Action and the Double Life of Intention

Cited by 71 publications

References 37 publications

Intentions: The dynamic hierarchical model revisited

Intentions: The dynamic hierarchical model revisited

Intention at the Interface

Between vision and action: introduction to the special issue

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