If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination, volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
Recent experiments have shown that when drug--dependent individuals are confronted with drug--related cues, they exhibit an automatically activated tendency to approach these cues (i.e., drug approach bias). The strength of the drug approach bias has been associated with clinically relevant measures, such as increased drug craving and relapse, as well as activations in brain reward areas. Moreover, retraining the approach bias by means of Cognitive Bias Modification has been demonstrated to decrease relapse rates in alcohol--dependent patients and to reduce alcohol cue--evoked limbic activity. Here, we review empirical and theoretical literature on the drug approach bias and explore two distinct models of how the drug approach bias may be embodied. First, we consider the "biological meaning" hypothesis, which grounds the automatic approach bias in the natural meaning of the body. Second, we consider the "sensorimotor hypothesis," which appeals to the specific sensorimotor loops involved in the instantiation of addictive behaviors as the basis of the automatic approach bias. In order to differentiate between the adequacies of these competing explanations, we present specific, predictions that each model should make.
In recent years, a debate concerning the nature of knowing‐how has emerged between intellectualists who claim that knowledge‐how is reducible to knowledge‐that and anti‐intellectualists who claim that knowledge‐how comprises a unique and irreducible knowledge category. The arguments between these two camps have clustered largely around two issues: (1) intellectualists object to Gilbert Ryle's assertion that knowing‐how is a kind of ability, and (2) anti‐intellectualists take issue with Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson's positive, intellectualist account of knowing‐how. Like most anti‐intellectualists, in this paper I will raise objections to Stanley and Williamson's account of knowing‐how and also defend the claim that ability is necessary for knowing‐how attributions. Unlike most discussions of knowing‐how, however, I will return to more Rylean considerations in order to illustrate that any intellectualist account of knowing‐how, not simply Stanley and Williamson's preferred variety, will fail because it will be unable to account for fundamental differences in the knowledge required to instantiate an ability and the knowledge involved in propositional thought.
If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination, volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.