Problems with intellectualism

Fridland, Ellen

doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9994-4

Cited by 49 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…It is a central feature of knowing how that enables coping with novel situations (Fridland, ; Hornsby, , pp. 89–95; Ryle, ; , p. 129; Stanley, , pp.…”

Section: Responses To the Generality Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The generality problem for intellectualism

Habgood‐Coote

2018

Mind & Language

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According to intellectualism, knowing how to V is a matter of knowing a suitable proposition about a way of Ving. In this paper, I consider the question of which ways of acting might figure in the propositions that intellectualists claim constitute the object of knowledge-how. I argue that intellectualists face a version of the generality problem-familiar from discussions of reliabilism-as not all ways of V-ing are such that knowledge about them suffices for knowledge-how. I consider various responses to this problem and argue that none are satisfactory.anti-intellectualism, generality problem, intellectualism, knowledge-how, reliabilism

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“…It is a central feature of knowing how that enables coping with novel situations (Fridland, ; Hornsby, , pp. 89–95; Ryle, ; , p. 129; Stanley, , pp.…”

Section: Responses To the Generality Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…See Schaffer on playing the flute (, p. 396), Braun’s discussion of the answer theory (, pp. 249–252), and Fridland’s discussion of granularity (Fridland, ).…”

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confidence: 99%

The generality problem for intellectualism

Habgood‐Coote

2018

Mind & Language

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“…For alternative interpretations of Ryle's arguments, see Cath (2013) and Fridland (2013). For AntiIntellectualism generally, see Hartland Swan (1956), Roland (1958), Koethe (2002), Schiffer (2002), Noë (2005), Cath (2011) (but see Cath 2015 and footnote 15), Fridland (2012Fridland ( , 2013, Setiya (2012), and Michaelson, ms. 7 Intellectualism is defended in Stanley and Williamson (2001), Snowdon (2003), Bengson and Moffett (2007), Brogaard (2008), Stanley (2011a, and Pavese, ms. For arguments against the force of Ryle's regress, see Stanley and Williamson (2001), Cath (2011), and Stanley (2011b. For critical responses, see Noë (2005) and Fridland (2013).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Doing without believing: Intellectualism, knowledge-how, and belief-attribution

Brownstein

Michaelson

2015

Synthese

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We consider a range of cases-both hypothetical and actual-in which agents apparently know how to ϕ but fail to believe that the way in which they in fact ϕ is a way for them to ϕ . These "no-belief" cases present a prima facie problem for Intellectualism about knowledge-how. The problem is this: if knowledge-that entails belief, and if knowing how to ϕ just is knowing that some w is a way for one to ϕ , then an agent cannot both know how to ϕ and fail to believe that w, the way that she ϕ s, is a way for her to ϕ . We discuss a variety of ways in which Intellectualists might respond to this challenge and argue that, ultimately, this debate converges with another, seemingly distinct debate in contemporary epistemology: how to attribute belief in cases of conflict between an agent's avowals and her behavior. No-belief cases, we argue, reveal how Intellectualism depends on the plausibility of positing something like "implicit beliefs"-which conflict with an agent's avowed beliefs-in many cases of apparent knowledge-how. While there may be good reason to posit implicit beliefs elsewhere, we suggest that there are at least some grounds for thinking that these reasons fail to carry over to no-belief cases, thus applying new pressure to Intellectualism.

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“…For a discussion of the view that automatic mechanisms cannot be invoked by an intellectualist to avoid Ryle's regress argument see Fridland, .…”

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confidence: 99%