Doing without believing: Intellectualism, knowledge-how, and belief-attribution

Brownstein, Michael; Michaelson, Eliot

doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0888-9

Cited by 25 publications

(18 citation statements)

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“…The idea of a mismatch between an agent's avowed beliefs and know-how is not unique to the case of joint action. Brownstein and Michaelson (2016) consider various cases in which an agent appears to know how to perform some individual action while believing, of the way he implements, that it cannot lead to success. However, as Brownstein andMichaelson (2016, p. 2830) acknowledge, the intellectualist can seek to account for these examples by positing beliefs held under a practical mode of presentation that contradict the agent's avowed beliefs (Stanley and Williamson 2001;Stanley 2011, Ch.…”

Section: Practical Modes Of Presentationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Joint know-how

Birch

2018

Philos Stud

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When two agents engage in a joint action, such as rowing together, they exercise joint know-how. But what is the relationship between the joint know-how of the two agents and the know-how each agent possesses individually? I construct an ''active mutual enablement'' (AME) account of this relationship, according to which joint know-how arises when each agent knows how to predict, monitor, and make failure-averting adjustments in response to the behaviour of the other agent, while actively enabling the other to make such adjustments. I defend the AME account from three objections, and I then use this account as the platform for an examination of the reducibility (or otherwise) of joint know-how to joint propositional knowledge. A summative account of joint propositional knowledge is incompatible with the reduction of joint know-how to joint propositional knowledge, whereas a distributive account is not (although serious difficulties for any such reduction remain). I close by highlighting some open questions the AME account brings into view concerning the evolutionary origin and scaling up of joint knowhow.

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Section: Practical Modes Of Presentationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Joint know-how

Birch

2018

Philos Stud

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“…For one thing, it is an open question whether truth, belief justification pertain to knowledge-how. It is easy to find views on which knowledge-how is connected to truth (Stanley and Williamson 2001), belief (Brownstein and Michaelson, 2015), and justification (Hawley 2003), (Brogaard 2011). Putting this issue to one side, even if it turned out that these conditions do not pertain to knowledge-how, this would not JNS: It is permissible to show someone how to V in way w, only if one has a justified belief that w is a way to V. 14 As in the case of assertion, these norms need not be mutually exclusive.…”

Section: What Are the Alternatives To Knowledge?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Knowing-how, showing, and epistemic norms

Habgood‐Coote

2017

Synthese

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General rightsThis document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms KNA: It is permissible to assert that p, only if one knows that p. 1 This norm says that an agent's assertion is permissible only if she knows what she says. If a speaker says that something which is false, unjustified or not known, then there is something inappropriate about that assertion. Crucially, KNA makes a claim about epistemic permission: an ignorant or false assertion can still be morally or prudentially 1 The knowledge-norm of assertion is formulated in several different ways: as an imperative or must claim (Williamson 2000: 241-3), as a claim about appropriateness (Brown 2008a), or as a claim about permissibility (Turri 2011: 37). There is also debate about whether the norm should also encompass the sufficiency claim (Brown 2008a(Brown , 2008b(Brown , 2010(Brown , 2012). I will not consider these issues since the counterexamples to the knowledge-norm of showing concern the necessity of know-how for appropriate showing, and will cause problems to any of these formulations.2 permissible, and a knowledgeable assertion can still be morally or prudentially impermissible. 2 Buckwalter and Turri (henceforth B&T) have recently opened up a parallel question about the epistemic permissibility of showing, claiming that 'just as knowledgethat is the norm of telling, so knowledge-how is the norm of showing ' (2014: 17). This is an important proposal, which if correct would offer insight into the normative significance of knowledge-how, deepen and widen the debate about epistemic norms, and give us a picture of the commonalities between knowledge-how and knowledge-that.Although they don't offer a formulation of this norm, the parallel norm to KNA would be a knowledge-how norm of showing, which we'll call KNS for short: KNS: It is permissible to show someone how to V, only if one knows how to V. intentional showing. In a case in which A secretly watches B make a tomato rose without B's knowledge we can say that B showed A how to make a tomato rose (Hawley 2010: 402), but I take it that this is not the sense of 'showing' that figures in KNS. 4 Moreover, KNS only concerns showing-how, and not the kind of activity that is involved in showing 2 From this point on, I will use unqualified claims about permissibility to refer to epistemic permission. 3 Although KNS is only significant if it is possible to show without having know-how. This is a point we will return to in §3.3. 4 The fact that I focus on cases in which one person learns from another's teaching should not distract us from the fact that we can also acquire know-how through imitation, practice, and simple trial and error. Since our focus will be on the norms on interpersonal teaching, giving a full account of the ways in which we can acquire know-how is beyond the scope of this paper. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for rai...

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“…Finally, some have observed that know how may differ from propositional knowledge in that, whereas the latter plausibly entails belief, know how does not (Wallis, ; Brownstein & Michaelson, ). For example, studies show that when catching a ball, ball players make anticipatory saccades to shift their gaze ahead of the ball one or more times during the course of its fight towards them.…”

Section: Arguments Against Intellectualism About Know Howmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In response, Pavese has developed a Fregean notion of practical modes of presentation-as practical senses-and has argued that examples of practical senses can be found in operational semantic values for programming languages (Pavese, 2015b). 11 Finally, some have observed that know how may differ from propositional knowledge in that, whereas the latter plausibly entails belief, know how does not (Wallis, 2008;Brownstein & Michaelson, 2015). For example, studies show that when catching a ball, ball players make anticipatory saccades to shift their gaze ahead of the ball one or more times during the course of its fight towards them.…”

Section: However Recently This Diagnosis Of Cath's Examples Has Beenmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Skill in epistemology II: Skill and know how

Pavese

2016

Philosophy Compass

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The prequel to this paper has discussed the relation between knowledge and skill and introduced the topic of the relationship between skill and know how. This sequel continues the discussion. First, I survey the recent debate on intellectualism about knowing how ( §1-3). Then, I tackle the question as to whether intellectualism (and antiintellectualism) about skill and intellectualism (and anti-intellectualism) about know how fall or stand together ( §4-5). Intellectualism about know how: The linguistic controversyAccording to intellectualism about know how, a subject S's knowing how to Φ, for some task Φ, is a matter of S's knowing a true answer to the question "How could he himself Φ?" An answer to such a question is of the form "w is a way he himself could Φ," for some way w for S to Φ. Accordingly, S's knowing how to Φ is a matter of S's knowing, for some way w to Φ, that w is a way he himself could Φ. Intellectualists add that such knowledge must be held "under a practical mode of presentation." To illustrate the need for such a qualification, suppose I look at a swimmer's swimming and my swimming instructor, pointing to the swimmer, says to me "That is a way in which you could swim too." I believe my instructor and what she said is in fact true. I may thereby come to know an answer to the question "How could I swim?" However, in the relevant sense, Imay not have come to know how to swim. For one to come to know how to Φ, in the relevant sense, it is for one to know an answer to the question "How could one oneself (Rumfitt, 2003;Roberts, 2009; Glick, 2009; Wiggins, 2012;Abbott, 2013;Ditter, 2015). In some languages, such as Italian and French, among others, know how ascriptions are of the form "S knows + bare infinitive" as in "Marie sait nager" and "Maria sa nuotare" (= "Mary knows to swim"). Italian and French ascribe know how through ascriptions embedding interrogatives ("S knows how to Φ") but also through ascriptions embedding bare infinitivals ("S knows + (bare infinitive) to Φ" (= "S knows to Φ")) as in "Marie sait nager" and "Maria sa nuotare."To this challenge, Stanley has responded that these ascriptions are to be analyzed as embedding an implicit interrogative -one where the question word "how" is not explicitly articulated (Stanley, 2011). However, Abbott and Ditter have observed that this response does not help with yet other languages, such as Russian, in which know how ascriptions -of the form "S (attitude verb) Vs + (infinitive) to Φ" -feature an embedding verb V ('umetj') that never licenses an interrogative complement nor a declarative complement (i.e., a that-clause) (Abbott, 2013; Ditter, 2016). Let us try to get clear about what this cross-linguistic evidence really establishes.Consider the following linguistic argument for intellectualism. It has five premises. The first is that in English, know how ascriptions are univocally of the form "S knows + (interrogative) how to Φ" (Logical Form Premise). The second premise is that the relevant interpretation of the subject of the inf...

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Doing without believing: Intellectualism, knowledge-how, and belief-attribution

Cited by 25 publications

References 84 publications

Joint know-how

Joint know-how

Knowing-how, showing, and epistemic norms

Skill in epistemology II: Skill and know how

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