The generality problem for intellectualism

Abstract

According to intellectualism, knowing how to V is a matter of knowing a suitable proposition about a way of Ving. In this paper, I consider the question of which ways of acting might figure in the propositions that intellectualists claim constitute the object of knowledge-how. I argue that intellectualists face a version of the generality problem-familiar from discussions of reliabilism-as not all ways of V-ing are such that knowledge about them suffices for knowledge-how. I consider various responses to this problem and argue that none are satisfactory.anti-intellectualism, generality problem, intellectualism, knowledge-how, reliabilism

Know-How e Ação Básica

“…Apresentado a tese de modo mais esquemático: S sabe como φ se e somente se S sabe que p e p é uma resposta adequada à questão "Como φ?" (HABGOOD-COOTE, 2018). Stanley e Williamson (2001, p. 431, tradução nossa) enfatizam a natureza linguística do argumento, baseado na análise sintática e semântica de questões:…”