Knowing-how: Problems and Considerations

Abstract

In recent years, a debate concerning the nature of knowing‐how has emerged between intellectualists who claim that knowledge‐how is reducible to knowledge‐that and anti‐intellectualists who claim that knowledge‐how comprises a unique and irreducible knowledge category. The arguments between these two camps have clustered largely around two issues: (1) intellectualists object to Gilbert Ryle's assertion that knowing‐how is a kind of ability, and (2) anti‐intellectualists take issue with Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson's positive, intellectualist account of knowing‐how. Like most anti‐intellectualists, in this paper I will raise objections to Stanley and Williamson's account of knowing‐how and also defend the claim that ability is necessary for knowing‐how attributions. Unlike most discussions of knowing‐how, however, I will return to more Rylean considerations in order to illustrate that any intellectualist account of knowing‐how, not simply Stanley and Williamson's preferred variety, will fail because it will be unable to account for fundamental differences in the knowledge required to instantiate an ability and the knowledge involved in propositional thought.

Know-How and Non-Propositional Intentionality

“…Independently of the outcome of the debate about practical knowledge, it's clear that the coach has some sort of highly developed expertise which deserves to be called knowledge. Both intellectualists and anti-intellectualists seem to agree that this knowledge is expressible in a propositional format, but intellectualists insist it's "knowing how", whereas anti-intellectualists may propose that the coach is better characterized as "knowing about how to do something", or perhaps "knowing how one ought to do something" (Fridland 2012, Glick 2012, Poston 2015. I am sceptical about the weight of these nuances in the formulation, partly because -again -other languages do not follow the same pattern.…”

“…The view inspired by Ryle's considerations on knowing how is now known as the "antiintellectualist" position (defended for example in Cath 2011, Glick 2012, Fridland 2012, Noë 2005, Poston 2009, and the opposing view, which holds that know-how is a type of propositional knowledge is known as "intellectualism" (Stanley and Williamson 2001, Snowdon 2003, Bengson and Moffett 2011, Stanley 2011a, 2011b. Anti-intellectualism about know-how has a negative and a positive part: first, it denies that (all) know-how is a type of know-that, and second, it claims that knowing how is a certain type of ability or disposition to perform the relevant action.…”

Practical Know‐Wh

“…Nonetheless, maybe a fancy case could be constructed where knowing a general formula worked for the purpose of acting. In arguments for the distinct nature of practical knowledge in the know‐how debate, it is sometimes claimed that no propositional knowledge is sufficient for practical knowledge (Fridland , Glick ). I do not want to claim that knowing a formula is never sufficient for the kind of practical know‐wh discussed here.…”

Doing without believing: Intellectualism, knowledge-how, and belief-attribution

“…For alternative interpretations of Ryle's arguments, see Cath (2013) and Fridland (2013). For AntiIntellectualism generally, see Hartland Swan (1956), Roland (1958), Koethe (2002), Schiffer (2002), Noë (2005), Cath (2011) (but see Cath 2015 and footnote 15), Fridland (2012Fridland ( , 2013, Setiya (2012), and Michaelson, ms. 7 Intellectualism is defended in Stanley and Williamson (2001), Snowdon (2003), Bengson and Moffett (2007), Brogaard (2008), Stanley (2011a, and Pavese, ms. For arguments against the force of Ryle's regress, see Stanley and Williamson (2001), Cath (2011), and Stanley (2011b. For critical responses, see Noë (2005) and Fridland (2013).…”