Intentions: The dynamic hierarchical model revisited

Abstract

Ten years ago, one of us proposed a dynamic hierarchical model of intentions that brought together philosophical work on intentions and empirical work on motor representations and motor control (Pacherie, 2008). The model distinguished among Distal intentions, Proximal intentions, and Motor intentions operating at different levels of action control (hence the name DPM model). This model specified the representational and functional profiles of each type of intention, as well their local and global dynamics, and the ways in which they interact. A core insight of the model was that action control is the result of integrated, coordinated activity across these levels of intention. Since the proposal of the model, empirical and theoretical works in philosophy and cognitive science have emerged that would seem to support and expand on this central insight. In particular, an updated understanding of the nature of sensorimotor processing and motor representations, as well as of how the different levels of intention and control interface and interact, allows for the further specification and precisification of the original DPM model. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Psychological Capacities Psychology > Motor Skill and Performance Philosophy > Action.

A Role for Conscious Accessibility in Skilled Action

“…Even in the context of this proposal, Pacherie acknowledged that her notion of Mintention was somewhat unorthodox, something that has been re-emphasised more recently by Mylopoulos and Pacherie (2019). Thanks to her unorthodox proposal, however, Pacherie should be credited with insightfully bringing to the attention of philosophers representations involved in the production of actions executed at a very quick pace and often spontaneously, raising the question as to whether these representations should be considered intentions.…”

Meta-control of the exploration-exploitation dilemma emerges from probabilistic inference over a hierarchy of time scales

“…In our environment, very different time scales coexist. For instance, a pedestrian's quick glance over her shoulder (which occurs on a time scale of a few hundred milliseconds) may indicate that she will be crossing the street (which may take several seconds), which may be part of the action plan to meet a friend at a café (which may span a time scale of two hours), which may be motivated by the intention to maintain positive social relations (which spans a time scale of years), (e.g., Mylopoulos and Pacherie 2019). In other words, in real life situations we are confronted with uncertainty about the relevance of different time scales, that is, one problem is to infer the relevant time scales for one's planning and goal reaching.…”

From Freedom From to Freedom To: New Perspectives on Intentional Action

“…Motor representations are nonpropositional states representing both the outcome of the action and the kinematic properties of the movement (Proust, 2003; Mylopoulos and Pacherie, 2017, 2018). However, no consensus has been reached about whether motor representations can count as intentions.…”

“…It thus comes as no surprise that the notions of intentional action and agency have attracted a considerable share of attention both in philosophy and in cognitive science. During the last few years, a cross-disciplinary naturalistic approach to intentional action – whereby the reference to foundational issues and up-to-date scientific findings are both held to be crucial – has taken hold and progressively flourished (Jeannerod, 2006; Nanay, 2013; Grünbaum, 2017; Mylopoulos and Pacherie, 2018; Haggard, 2019).…”