Semantic Externalism

Kallestrup, Jesper

doi:10.4324/9780203830024

Cited by 19 publications

(21 citation statements)

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“…First of all, if, as one might argue, one's second-order knowledge comes almost 'for free' together with one's first-order knowledge, then the following question arises: What is this second-order knowledge grounded on? One plausible answer could be that our second 29 For an interesting response to the McKinsey Paradox that accepts the conclusion of the paradox while arguing that it is not absurd, see Sawyer (1998 Kallestrup (2011Kallestrup ( , 2012.…”

Section: Easy Second-order Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

Armchair Access and Imagination

Fratantonio

2018

Dialectica

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In this paper, I focus on the Armchair Access Problem for E=K as presented by Nicholas Silins, and I argue, contra Silins, that it does not represent a real threat to E=K. More precisely, I put forward two lines of response, both of which put pressure on the main assumption of the argument, namely, the Armchair Access thesis. The first line of response focuses on its scope, while the second line of response focuses on its nature. The second line of response is the most interesting one, for it represents the framework within which I develop a novel account of second-order knowledge, one that involves evaluation of counterfactual conditionals and the employment of our imaginative capacities, i.e., an imagination-based account of second-order knowledge. The two lines of response are shown to be jointly compatible and mutually supportive. I then conclude that the Armchair Access Problem is not a challenge for E=K, yet it relies on the ambiguity of the notion of armchair knowledge underpinning the Armchair Access thesis.1 Henceforth, when I refer to Externalism, I have in mind what here I call, following Silins, Evidential Externalism, rather than more traditional varieties of externalism about epistemic justification, e.g., process reliabilism. For an overview of the main arguments and motivations behind Evidential Internalism and Evidential Externalism, see Fratantonio (forthcoming).

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Section: Easy Second-order Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

Armchair Access and Imagination

Fratantonio

2018

Dialectica

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“…See, for example, Putnam (). For a recent discussion of standard twin‐earth arguments, see Kallestrup (, ch. 3).…”

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confidence: 99%

“…In fact, Chalmers (, 58) is explicit that if the watery stuff in our world turned out to be a mixture of 95% H 2 O and 5% XYZ, the primary intension of ‘water’ would pick out only H 2 O. For more details, see Kallestrup (, chs. 3 & 4).…”

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confidence: 99%

Epistemic Dependence

Pritchard

2015

Philosophical Perspectives

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ABSTRACT. The goal of this paper is to explore and defend the epistemic dependence of knowledge⎯roughly, the dependence of one's knowledge on factors outwith one's cognitive agency⎯and to situate this thesis within a wider framework for thinking about knowledge, one on which knowledge demands both cognitive agency and extra-agential factors. It is argued that the epistemic dependence thesis comes in both positive (knowledge-enabling) and negative (knowledge-precluding) forms, and that properly understood it runs contrary to a number of central movements in contemporary epistemology. Despite appearances, the question of whether one's epistemology allows for epistemic dependence runs orthogonal to the epistemic externalism/internalism distinction. Instead, it reflects a rather different dispute between epistemic individualism and epistemic anti-individualism. A narrow form of epistemic individualism is contrasted with a broader form that allows for extended cognitive processes. While our initial focus is on perceptual knowledge specifically, it is also shown that with this framework in place, the prospects for a distinctively social epistemic anti-individualism are very sound. Furthermore, it is claimed that this result is not specific to a particular social kind of knowledge, but rather reflects a point about knowledge in general. This is brought out by considering epistemic twin earth arguments that demonstrate the general epistemic dependence of knowledge. Social epistemic anti-individualism is thus motivated on more general antiindividualist grounds, reflecting the wider reach of the epistemic dependence thesis. The rationale for this thesis within a broader approach to knowledge that allows for both agential and extra-agential factors to play a role⎯what I call anti-luck virtue epistemology⎯is then explored.

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“…See, for example, Putnam . For a recent discussion of standard twin‐earth arguments, see Kallestrup : ch. 3.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…In fact, Chalmers : 58 is explicit that if the watery stuff in our world turned out to be a mixture of 95% H 2 O and 5% XYZ, the primary intension of ‘water’ would pick out only H 2 O. For more details, see Kallestrup : Chs. 3 and 4.…”

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confidence: 99%

Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth

Kallestrup

Pritchard

2011

European J of Philosophy

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A popular form of virtue epistemology—defended by such figures as Ernest Sosa, Linda Zagzebski and John Greco—holds that knowledge can be exclusively understood in virtue‐theoretic terms. In particular, it holds that there isn't any need for an additional epistemic condition to deal with the problem posed by knowledge‐undermining epistemic luck. It is argued that the sustainability of such a proposal is called into question by the possibility of epistemic twin earth cases. In particular, it is argued that such cases demonstrate the need for virtue‐theoretic accounts of knowledge to appeal to an independent epistemic condition which excludes knowledge‐undermining epistemic luck.

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Semantic Externalism

Cited by 19 publications

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Armchair Access and Imagination

Armchair Access and Imagination

Epistemic Dependence

Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth

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