Armchair Access and Imagination

Abstract

In this paper, I focus on the Armchair Access Problem for E=K as presented by Nicholas Silins, and I argue, contra Silins, that it does not represent a real threat to E=K. More precisely, I put forward two lines of response, both of which put pressure on the main assumption of the argument, namely, the Armchair Access thesis. The first line of response focuses on its scope, while the second line of response focuses on its nature. The second line of response is the most interesting one, for it represents the framework within which I develop a novel account of second-order knowledge, one that involves evaluation of counterfactual conditionals and the employment of our imaginative capacities, i.e., an imagination-based account of second-order knowledge. The two lines of response are shown to be jointly compatible and mutually supportive. I then conclude that the Armchair Access Problem is not a challenge for E=K, yet it relies on the ambiguity of the notion of armchair knowledge underpinning the Armchair Access thesis.1 Henceforth, when I refer to Externalism, I have in mind what here I call, following Silins, Evidential Externalism, rather than more traditional varieties of externalism about epistemic justification, e.g., process reliabilism. For an overview of the main arguments and motivations behind Evidential Internalism and Evidential Externalism, see Fratantonio (forthcoming).

Reflective Access, Closure, and Epistemological Disjunctivism

“…The second premise AP2 is a thesis about S's knowledge of the truth-entailing nature of 8 Note that a similar problem might arise for other varieties of evidential externalism, e.g., for Williamson's E=K (see Silins 2005, Littlejohn 2012). However, in Fratantonio (2018) I argue that the Access Problem does not represent a threat to E=K. See also Fratantonio & McGlynn 2018, p. 86-90.…”

No Infelicity for the Infallibilist

“…4 Many epistemologists endorse SKE by defending the idea that p is part of one's evidence if and only if one knows that p (E = K). See Williamson, 2000, Hyman, 2006, Littlejohn, 2008, Logins, 2017, Fratantonio, 2018 Another reason to take this challenge seriously is that, contrary to internalist accounts of evidence, externalist theories like SKE are generally thought of as being the antidote to scepticism (Cf. Williamson 2000, ch.…”

Persistent burglars and knocks on doors: Causal indispensability of knowing vindicated

“…2 See, for instance, Williamson (2000, pp. 184-208), Sutton (2007), Bird (2007), Hawthorne and Stanley (2008), Ichikawa (2014), Kelp (2016Kelp ( , 2018, Littlejohn (2017), Logins (2014Logins ( , 2017, Silva (2017), Fratantonio (2018); see Benton (2014) and Silva Jr (2020) for recent overviews. 3 The principles (1), (2), and (3) are numbered as ( 18), ( 19), and ( 20) respectively in the original publication.…”

“…2 2 See, for instance, Williamson (2000, pp. 184–208), Sutton (2007), Bird (2007), Hawthorne and Stanley (2008), Ichikawa (2014), Kelp (2016, 2018), Littlejohn (2017), Logins (2014, 2017), Silva (2017), Fratantonio (2018); see Benton (2014) and Silva Jr (2020) for recent overviews. …”