No Infelicity for the Infallibilist

Abstract

According to probability 1 infallibilism (henceforth, infallibilism), if one knows that p, then the probability of p given one's evidence is 1. Jessica Brown (2013, Analysis, 73, 626-635; Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge, 2018) has recently argued that infallibilism leads to scepticism unless the infallibilist also endorses the claim that if one knows that p, then p is part of one's evidence for p. By doing that, however, the infalliblist has to explain why it is infelicitous to cite p as evidence for itself. And yet, the infallibilist does not seem to have a satisfying explanation available. Call this the infelicity challenge for probability 1 infallibilism. By exploiting the distinction between the justifying and the motivating role of evidence, in this paper I argue that contrary to first appearances, the infelicity challenge does not arise for probability 1 infallibilism. However, after anticipating and resisting two objections to my argument, I show that we can identify a different version of infallibilism which seems to face a problem that is even more serious than the infelicity challenge.

Replies to Fratantonio and Lasonen-Aarnio; Goldberg; Greco; Kelp, Carter and Simion; Littlejohn; and Williamson

“…Following Fratantonio ( 2021 ) FLA suggest that SKSS admits of two different readings, of which only one would give rise to problematic infelicity data but that reading needn’t be accepted by the infallibilist. First consider a motivational reading, where q is motivating evidence for p for S if and only if q is the evidence that motivated S to believe that p. In this sense, if S is asked what’s her evidence for p, it would be infelicitous for her to reply by saying p. For, p is not what motivated her to believe p which is plausibly instead motivated by some distinct evidence.…”