ABSTRACT. It is argued that there are two 'master' intuitions about knowledge⎯an anti-luck intuition and an ability intuition⎯and that these impose distinct epistemic demands. It is claimed that recognising this fact leads one towards a new proposal in the theory of knowledge⎯anti-luck virtue epistemology⎯which can avoid the problems that afflict other theories of knowledge. This proposal is motivated in contrast to two other ways of thinking about knowledge which are shown to be ultimately unsuccessful: anti-luck epistemology and virtue epistemology. Finally, a diagnosis is offered of why our concept of knowledge should have the kind of structure dictated by anti-luck virtue epistemology.

This paper explores the ramifications of the extended cognition thesis in the philosophy of mind for contemporary epistemology. In particular, it argues that all theories of knowledge need to accommodate the ability intuition that knowledge involves cognitive ability, but that once this requirement is understood correctly there is no reason why one could not have a conception of cognitive ability that was consistent with the extended cognition thesis. There is thus, surprisingly, a straightforward way of developing our current thinking about knowledge such that it incorporates the extended cognition thesis. Introductory remarksOne of the most interesting proposals in the recent literature in the philosophy of mind has been the suggestion that there is no in principle bar to cognitive processes extending beyond the skin of the agent. As one of the foremost exponents of this thesis has expressed the matter, "cognitive processes are not located exclusively inside the skin of cognizing organisms" (Rowlands 1999, p. 22). This is the so-called extended cognition thesis. This thesis poses a radical challenge to our normal theorising about cognition which largely takes it as given that cognitive processes take place exclusively under the skin of the agent. Indeed, insofar as one treats cognitive processes as mental processes, then the extended cognition thesis generates a more radical conclusion still-viz., that the mind can extend beyond the skin of the agent too (the extended

This paper aims to explain and discuss the complex nature and value of knowledge as an exploitable resource for business. Design/methodology/approachThe authors propose a conceptual explanation of knowledge based on three pillars: the plurality of its nature, understood to be conservative, multipliable and generative, its contextual value and the duality of carrier incorporating business knowledge, objects or processes. After conceptualizing the nature of knowledge, the authors offer a metaphor based on the classic transformation from "potential" to "kinetic" energy in an inclined plane assuming that the conservative nature of knowledge makes it act as energy. FindingsThe metaphor uses the concept of potential and kinetic energy: if energy is only potential, it has a potential value not yet effective, whereas if the potential energy (knowledge) becomes kinetic energy (products and/or services), it generates business value. In addition, business value is a function of the speed acquired and caused by the angle of inclined plan, namely, the company's business model. Knowledge is the source of the value and can be maintained and regenerated only through continuous investments. Several years later the value extraction reaches a null value of the company (potential energy) which will cease to act (kinetic energy) for triggering both the value generated and the value extracted. Originality/valueThe paper proposes an initial attempt to explain the meaning of the transformation of knowledge using a metaphor derived from physics. The metaphor of the energy of knowledge clearly depicts the managerial dilemma of balancing a company's resources for both the generating and extracting value. Similarly, future study should try to associate other knowledge peculiarities to physical phenomena.

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I discuss the sceptical challenge in the light of the distinction between veritic and reflective epistemic luck and argue that the inadequacy of the main anti-sceptical proposals in the contemporary literature is a result of how they only (at best) eliminate veritic luck, and thus do not engage with the problem of reflective luck at all. Crucially, however, I claim that it is the specific challenge posed by reflective luck that is central to the sceptical problem, and yet there is a fundamental sense in which this type of epistemic luck is ineliminable. I argue that it is this sceptical problem that informs the Pyrrhonian sceptical challenge of antiquity. Moreover, I further maintain that the so-called ‘metaepistemological’ sceptical challenge that features prominently in contemporary epistemological debate—as advanced, for example, by Barry Stroud and Richard Fumerton—is best understood in terms of the specific sceptical problem regarding the ineliminability of reflective luck.

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This essay offers a rearticulation and defence of the modal account of luck that the author developed in earlier work (e.g., Pritchard 2005). In particular, the proposal is situated within a certain methodology, a component of which is paying due attention to the cognitive science literature on luck (and risk) ascriptions. It is shown that with the modal account of luck properly articulated it can adequately deal with some of the problems that have recently been offered against it, and that the view has a number of attractions over competing proposals, such as the lack of control account.

this paper explores the prospects for safetybased theories of knowledge in the light of some recent objections. i. SaFEtY-BaSED EPiStEMOLOGY n a number of places-see, for example, Pritchard (2002a; 2002b; 2004; 2005a; 2007a; 2007b)-i have defended the thesis that the safety principle, in some form at least, needs to play a central role in our theory of knowledge. 1 in particular, in Pritchard (2005a; cf. Pritchard 2004; 2007a), i defended this claim in terms of an epistemological project that i called an anti-luck epistemology. the starting point for this project is our overarching intuition that knowledge is incompatible with luck, what i call the anti-luck platitude. if we take this platitude seriously, then it suggests a novel way of approaching the problem of offering a definition of knowledge. What is required, it seems, is a three-stage investigation. first, we offer an account of luck. second, we specify the sense in which knowledge is incompatible with luck. finally, third, we put all this together to offer an anti-luck analysis of knowledge. interestingly, it turns out (or so i argue at any rate) that this project of developing an anti-luck epistemology leads directly to the endorsement of a version of the safety principle as a key component in any adequate theory of knowledge. essentially, the reason for this was that luck turns out to be a modal notion. very roughly (the details don't matter for our purposes here), an event is lucky provided that it obtains in the actual world but does not obtain in most nearby possible worlds. 2 (think, for example, of a lottery win-a paradigm case of a lucky eventas opposed to an event that is clearly not lucky, such as that the sun has risen this morning.) Unsurprisingly, then, it follows that what is required to eliminate luck (in the relevant sense) from knowledge will turn out to be a modal principle. the core sense in which knowledge is incompatible with luck that i identified concerned